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“Leave Them Kids Alone”
A Proposed Fair Use Defense For Noncommercial
P2P Sharing of Copyrighted Music Files
1

Jeremy Scott*
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology is, at once, the “alpha” and “omega” of copyright law.
2
The “alpha” of copyright law was a single invention, the printing
press, which spawned a publishing industry that required government
3
protection from acts of commercial piracy. The “omega” has come, at
various times, in a series of paradigm shifts brought about by new
4
technologies. These breakthroughs have often forced our legal system to revisit outdated rules that were unable to embrace the benefits
5
of these new technologies in the marketplace. In fact, we are currently in the midst of such a paradigm shift, and online file sharing is set to
become the “omega” of a copyright holder’s control over noncommercial sharing of his expressive works.
*
J.D., 2007, Florida International University College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Hannibal Travis for guiding me, ever so patiently, through the ins and outs of copyright
law and the fair use doctrine, and Eddie Rodriguez, for his helpful, knowledgeable and practical
suggestions regarding the best way to go about doing this project. I would also like to extend my
thanks to all of the other members of the FIU Law Review for their patience, support and encouragement.
1
Roger Waters, Another Brick in the Wall, Pt. 2, on THE WALL (Sony 1987).
2
There are historical precursors to what we now know as copyright law, but the time
required to hand-copy books before the invention of the printing press served as a substantial
barrier to commercial piracy. See Craig W. Dallon, The Problem With Congress and Copyright
Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 377-78
(2004). See also discussion infra Part III(a)(i).
3
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429-31 (1984).
4
See id. at 430 n.11 (noting Congressional responses in copyright law to new technologies).
5
See, e.g., White-Smith Music v. Apollo, 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908) (noting that “the use of [piano] rolls, in the absence of statutory protection, enables the manufacturers thereof to enjoy the
use of musical compositions for which they pay no value[,]” but holding that “such considerations properly address themselves to the legislative, and not to the judicial, branch of the government.”); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345, 1359 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (noting that the
advent of the photocopying machine brought “grave uncertainty of the coverage of ‘copy’ in
Section 1 of the 1909 [Copyright Act] and [expressing] doubt [as to] whether it relates at all to
periodicals.”).
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American and English legal history support a vision of copyright
law that is grounded in the premise that copyright exists primarily to
maximize public benefit: Once a given work is published, it enters the
public domain, but the rights given to those members of the public
who possess the work are limited in a manner consistent with the pub6
lic interest of encouraging authors and artists to create new works.
This public interest is the “purpose” of statutory copyright protection,
and the “method” chosen to achieve that purpose is a limited statutory monopoly endorsed by the government, which imposes restrictions
on the use of expressive works in a manner that maximizes an au7
thor’s incentive to create further works.
Part II of this article examines the emerging technology of file
sharing and its current status under copyright jurisprudence. This Part
also dissects a number of previously proposed solutions to the file
sharing “problem,” and ultimately sets forth the premise that noncommercial file sharing between private individuals should be considered a fair use for three basic reasons: (1) the Copyright Act of 1976
fails to adequately address the nuances of P2P file sharing, and courts
should wait for Congress to act, rather than stepping into Congress’s
shoes and cobbling together a doctrine of their own; (2) there is a substantial public benefit in the broad dissemination of expressive content brought about by P2P file sharing systems; and (3) while it is
questionable whether noncommercial file sharing actually harms the
commercial interests of copyright holders, it cannot, specifically in the
case of music sharing, be shown to harm the artists’ incentive to create.
Therefore, when one considers the significant public interest in efficient dissemination of expressive content, the vast superiority of P2P
as a mode of dissemination, the fact that the current record industry
does not efficiently incentivize the majority of artists, and the constitutional mandate to apply the statutory monopoly in a limited fashion
that directly addresses whether it is incentivizing the creation of expressive content, one could rationally conclude that noncommercial
file sharing should be allowed.
Part III of the article examines the history of copyright law, and
asks whether modern legislative interpretations of the Copyright
8
Clause such as the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), and judi-

6
Dallon, supra note 2, at 368-71. See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY:
FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 135-44 (2003) (comparing the American “public interest” perspective on copyright with the French tradition of granting copyright based on
the moral rights of authors).
7
See discussion infra Part III(c).
8
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
[hereinafter “CTEA”].
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cial doctrines such as the application of “fair use,” are consistent with
the underlying public interest rationale for copyright. This Part also
details the argument that historically, copyright law was designed to
protect the commercial interests of publishers, an interest that may no
longer be sacrosanct in the digital environment, and explains why artists’ interests and the public’s interests may be misaligned with the
interests of the current generation of copyright holders. If that much
is clear, then the ultimate question becomes one of method. Clearly
Congress can act to expand or limit the protections afforded copyright
holders, but courts need not be complicit in Congress’s approach. They
also have the authority, under the Constitution and the fair use doctrine, to jettison the surplus protection necessary in a pre-P2P market
and realign the monopoly afforded by copyright with the public benefit and the artists’ incentive to create expressive works.
Part IV of this article examines the fair use doctrine in detail; first
from a theoretical perspective, and second in its application to new
technologies. This Part ultimately argues that fair use should be expanded to examine, in the event of a noncommercial use, whether a
given copyright restriction advances or curtails the public interest, and
can be shown to be a disincentive to creation. This analysis requires
balancing the artists’ monetary incentive to create new works with the
public’s interest in the enjoyment of those works, but this section ultimately sets forth that we should approach infringement permissively
where there is no direct commercial benefit conferred upon those copying their material.
Applying this rationale to the recording industry, it becomes clear
that the artists’ incentive to create music, on average, is not harmed
significantly by file sharing, because the vast majority of profit from
9
the production and sale of CDs is retained by the record companies,
10
and only a small amount goes to the artists themselves. But the very
nature of the Internet makes the primary historical functions of the
record company—the production, marketing and distribution of
CDs—unnecessary. Because there is a great public benefit in having
both public domain and copyrighted material available on P2P networks, and because the monetary incentives retained by artists from
the sale of their records are so small, noncommercial file sharing on
these networks should be a fair use.

9
See generally Lee Ann Obringer, Howstuffworks – How Music Royalties Work, at
http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/music-royalties.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
10 Id.
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FILE SHARING: THE (INADVERTENT) CELESTIAL (PANDORA’S)
JUKEBOX
11

In 1995, the Information Infrastructure Task Force (“IITF”)
coined the term, “Celestial Jukebox,” theorizing that at some point in
the not-too-distant future, advances in communications technology
would enable instantaneous access to all manner of on-demand content, including movies, music, games, and anything else a user could
12
want that had been digitized. At the time, the IITF thought it would
be necessary to readdress some of the core concepts of intellectual
property law in order to encourage copyright holders to participate in
13
this new medium for dissemination. According to Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
Bruce A. Lehman:
[a]ll the computers, telephones, fax machines, scanners,
cameras, keyboards, televisions, monitors, printers, switches,
routers, wires, cables, networks and satellites in the world
will not create a successful [Celestial Jukebox], if there is no
content. What will drive the [Celestial Jukebox] is the con14
tent moving through it.
The IITF was absolutely right about the promise of the technologies it was studying. The Internet infrastructure has a fabulous potential to disseminate information on a never-before-seen scale. It is by
far the cheapest and fastest distribution mechanism for expressive or
informative works the world has ever seen. What the IITF did not
count on was the “culture of free” that grew up in this environment,
and that has been responsible for the explosive growth and develop15
ment of the Internet over the last ten years. The Internet turned out

11 For a discussion of the mandate of and the procedure taken by the IITF in the midnineties, see Cassandra Infeld & Victoria Smith Ekstrand, The Music Industry and the Legislative
Development of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Online Service Provider Provision, 10
COMM. L. & POL’Y. 291, 297-300 (2005).
12 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 187 (discussing the impact of the IITF’s “white paper”
on the future of digital technology and examining the concept of the “Celestial Jukebox”); see
also INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
RIGHTS
222
(1995)
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf (coining the term, “celestial jukebox”).
13 See Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights: Hearing on S. 1284 and H.R. 2441 Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (Statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant
Sec’y of Commerce and Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/nii-hill.html.
14 Id. at 6.
15 Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 1, 4 (2004).
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to be a place where content was freely disseminated and shared be16
tween individuals, not hoarded by them. It is a simple quirk of human behavior that was largely unanticipated by the IITF: There was
no need for the government to sponsor the provision of content over
the Internet in order to create some kind of “Celestial Jukebox,” because users would provide the content themselves, but when the users
provided that content, they would not care to distinguish between
17
what was copyrighted and what was not.
As a result, Pandora’s Box had been opened. As technology improved, providing ever-faster access to ever-broader content, copyright holders sought refuge from the “culture of free” through litigation. The courts, for their part, were ill-equipped to deal fairly with
the issue. They were left interpreting a Copyright Act that was too old
to address the changes wrought by the Internet, and applying that Act
to technologies that were too young to be fully understood. The results of these litigation efforts created a tennis match of law and technology that continues to this day. And nowhere is the futility of attempting to place restrictions on noncommercial sharing between users more evident than in cases dealing with online file sharing.
A. The File Sharing Controversy
It seems appropriate that a discussion of the copyright ramifications of file sharing should begin by examining the underlying technology. After all, without this technology, infringement of music copyrights over the Internet would be impossible (or improbable), and
there would be no need to delve into questions about the nature of
noncommercial copyright infringement or whether, sans protection
18
against this infringement, artists would stop making music. Copyright law is unique in that its development is inevitably and inexorably
19
tied to the conveniences offered by new technologies. In fact, this
16

See id.
See generally id.
18 This is mentioned by the Founding Fathers as the reason for their grant of statutory
monopolies, which, in a diffused form, exist in the Copyright Act. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8 (“promot[ing] the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings . . . .”) (emphasis added), with 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000)
(establishing that “the owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to . . . authorize” reproduction,
the preparation of derivative works, distribution, public performance, display, and digital sound
transmissions) (emphasis added), and 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (establishing that a “fair use of a
copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright”).
19 See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (noting that “the
main reason why determination of the question [of whether library photocopying can constitute
a fair use] is so difficult is that the text of the Copyright Act of 1909, which governs the case, does
not supply, by itself, a clear or satisfactory answer”), aff’d, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (noting that “[s]ound policy, as
17
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entire area of law became necessary largely because of a single tech20
nological development—the printing press —and subsequent innovations have forced it to develop from narrow protections designed to
serve the commercial interests of early publishers to the legal jungle
21
we know today. In this push-pull relationship between law and technology, it is important to understand the technology first, so that we
may accurately assess the law.
File sharing, at its most basic, is a “Frankenstein” of other technologies. The most prominent are file transferring, search engines and
22
compressed file architectures like the mp3 file format. File transferring enables users to send information directly from computer to
computer across a network. A user enters some physical information,
which his computer transforms into digital information, then sends
that information to another computer, via a modem, DSL line or other
23
device, where it is decoded at the other end. The ability to transfer
files between one computer and another is an inherent component of
the architecture of the Internet.
The search engine is simply a “software program that searches a
database and gathers and reports information that contains or is re24
lated to specified terms.” In a nutshell, a user enters terms from his
own computer and the search engine “searches” for those terms on a
given network. That network can be large enough to include the entire Internet, or it can be very small, accessing only a limited database
of materials. Search engine technology is an extremely valuable method of navigating the information available on the Internet. Some of
the larger search engines, like Yahoo! and Google, have become part

well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials”); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television,
Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968) (noting, in a case dealing with new television signal dissemination
technology, that “our inquiry [into the meaning of the Copyright Act] cannot be limited to ordinary meaning and legislative history, for this is a statute that was drafted long before the development of the electronic phenomena with which we deal here”).
20 Dallon, supra note 2, at 366-67; see generally ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING
REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1983).
21 See LEONARDAS VYTAUTAS GERULAITIS, PRINTING AND PUBLISHING IN FIFTEENTHCENTURY VENICE 30-43 (1976) (discussing the various privileges afforded to printers by European governments).
22 Modern file sharing programs like Kazaa are larger and have the ability to share a wider
variety of files, such as programs and movies, but this does not change the basic design architecture of file sharing programs.
23 See generally Robert Frieden, MSN Encarta – Telecommunications (2005), at
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761566546_1/Telecommunications.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2006).
24 “Search Engine,” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.
1995), available at http://www.ask.com/reference/dictionary/ahdict/58678/search+engine (last
visited Feb. 7, 2006).
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25

of our cultural lexicon. These large-scale search engines are designed
26
to search the World Wide Web for pages matching users’ queries, but
the potential uses of search engine technology are not limited to the
World Wide Web. In fact, a searchable database can be built any way
a designer wishes, provided he has sufficient technical skills.
The second technological innovation, which was not directly responsible for file sharing technology but had a huge impact on its early viability, is the mp3 file format. Music is encoded on CDs in what is
called a “.wav” or “wave” format, which consumes a great deal of
27
computer memory because the format contains a broad spectrum of
sounds. Wave files are less suitable for Internet distribution because
their “size,” the amount of information one would have to transfer
over the web, would make download times prohibitively long. The
mp3 format uses what is called “perceptual noise shaping,” a compression algorithm that “cuts out” aspects of a recording that a human ear
cannot hear, resulting in greatly reduced file sizes that are suitable for
28
dissemination on the Internet. Although modern file sharing networks share many file types other than the mp3, the idea of trading
mp3s, and arguably a lack of industry involvement in early Internet
distribution, spurred the evolution of file sharing technology.
All file-sharing technologies share a similar set of underlying characteristics. At their most basic level, they allow end-users to access a
29
“network” of other computers using the same program. Once this
network of computers is accessed, a built-in search engine allows users
to send out requests for a particular file and receive a list of other
30
computers that have that particular file available. Once the list is

25 Google has even achieved “verb” status. To “google” someone means to search for
background information about them on the Web using the popular search engine. See “Google,”
Webster’s New Millennium Dictionary of English, Preview Edition (2005), available at
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=google (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
26 Both can search for pictures as well, but it is not possible for Google or Yahoo! to search
solely for mp3 files.
27 Marshall
Brian, Howstuffworks – “How MP3 Files Work” (2005), at
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/mp31.htm (noting that “the average [three minute long]
song on a CD consumes about 32 million bytes of space,” which is “a lot of space for one song,
and it's especially large when you consider that over a 56K modem, it would take close to two
hours to download that one song,” and that “[t]he goal of the MP3 format is to compress a CDquality song by a factor of 10 to 14 without noticably [sic] affecting the CD-quality sound.”).
28 See id. (noting that “[w]ith MP3, a 32-megabyte (MB) song on a CD compresses down
to about 3 MB. This lets you download a song in minutes rather than hours, and store hundreds
of songs on your computer’s hard disk without taking up that much space”).
29 See Hillary M. Kowalski, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Technological Sabotage Tactics:
No Legislation Required, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 297, 299 (2004) (discussing P2P network architectures).
30 See Damien A. Riehl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella, and
Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1761, 1764-66, 1773-
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compiled, users can click on a file name or an icon, connect to one of
the other computers on the network, and download the file to their
31
own computer. Once the file is downloaded, it is placed in a folder
and may be made available to other users performing their own
32
searches. In this fashion, files are replicated, multiplied, and propa33
gated throughout a given network. Of course, the network does not
discriminate whether a given file is copyrighted or not; in fact, without
a layer of “filtering” software, it would be unable to do so. The
“choice” of whether to share copyrighted material has been left up to
34
users, and users have overwhelmingly chosen to share.
There are essentially three iterations of file sharing technologies.
“Direct” networks are the simplest form of file sharing, and it would
probably be inappropriate to even classify them as “P2P” per se. In a
“direct network,” users log on or simply visit a website connected to a
server that contains media files for download. The user then clicks on
35
an icon and downloads or streams the file directly from the website.
“Centralized” P2P networks use central servers as a “hub,” indexing
the names of each file shared by a given computer and disseminating
36
those names to users looking for similar files to download. “Decentralized” P2P networks are the offspring of the legal failings of “centralized” models. In these networks, some computers act as “nodes,”

76 (2001) (discussing Napster [centralized] and Gnutella [decentralized] file sharing architectures); See also Lisa J. Beyer Sims, Mutiny on the Net: Ridding P2P Pirates of their Booty, 52
EMORY L.J. 1907, 1910 (2003) (discussing P2P technology).
31 See generally Damien A. Riehl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1761 (2001).
32 See Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd., [2005] F.C.A.
1242, § 62 (noting that by default, the Kazaa P2P system “can be the subject of a search result
provided to another Kazaa user and a copy of that file can be transferred from the supplying
user’s My Shared Folder to the searching user’s computer” although that option is cancelable by
the user).
33 See id.
34 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005)
(noting that, according to plaintiff’s calculations, 90 percent of music available on defendant’s
FastTrack network was copyrighted); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025
(9th Cir. 2001) (noting “evidence of massive, unauthorized downloading and uploading of plaintiffs’ copyrighted works--as many as 10,000 files per second by defendant’s own admission”).
35 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing the “direct network” technology offered to users by MP3.com).
36 Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An
Empirical
Analysis
6
(2004),
available
at
http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf [hereinafter “Oberholzer &
Strumpf Report”]. Oberholzer and Strumpf also discuss a third type of network called a “hybrid” network, but the distinction between “hybrid” and “decentralized is not substantial enough,
on a legal level, to warrant discussion here. Id.
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and connect on their own to other computers in the network without
37
accessing any centralized “hub.”
38
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. is a precursor to many of
the modern P2P network cases. The defendant, MP3.com, owned a
website which contained “tens of thousands of popular CDs in which
39
plaintiffs held the copyrights.” Ironically, MP3.com, unlike later file
sharing programs, took steps to prevent unauthorized access to copyrighted music files.
[I]n order to first access [the copyrighted recordings], a subscriber to MP3.com must either “prove” that he already
owns the CD version of the recording by inserting his copy
of the commercial CD into his computer CD-Rom drive for
a few seconds . . . or must purchase the CD from one of de40
fendant’s cooperating online retailers. . . .
Because of these modifications, MP3.com felt it could safely as41
sert a defense of fair use, a traditional harbor for defendants in copyright infringement cases. MP3.com argued that since it took pains to
prevent those who did not already own a CD from accessing its music
files, its listeners were merely engaging in what it termed “transformative space shifting,” moving music from their CDs to their computers
42
by using the MP3.com service. This underlying use, MP3.com argued,
was fair: (1) because it was transformative from one format to another; (2) because it did not allow users to copy CDs which they did not
43
already own; and (3) because there was, at that time, no other method of receiving MP3 files over the Internet. Therefore, MP3.com
was providing an important service which was unavailable anywhere
else. The court, however, noting that the “defendant [sought] to attract a sufficiently large subscription base to draw advertising and
otherwise make a profit” from its use of the copyrighted material, held
that a defense based on the “fair use” of “transformative space shift44
ing” could not stand.

37

Id.
MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
39 Id. at 350.
40 Id.
41 Id. See also discussion infra Part IV.
42 Id. at 351.
43 Ironically, this space shifting argument was accepted in the context of portable mp3
players. See Recording Industry Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180
F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the denial of an injunction against a portable MP3
player manufacturer because “the Rio's operation is entirely consistent with the [Home Recording Act of 1992’s] main purpose – the facilitation of personal use”).
44 MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
38
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In A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the court dealt with its
first “true” file-sharing program. Napster was designed and built
along a “centralized” model, allowing users to access an index of file
listings maintained by a centralized set of servers owned by the defen46
dant. Napster’s servers, unlike MP3.com’s, did not contain any copyrighted material at all; they merely indexed lists of files contained on
47
the computers of other Napster users. The plaintiffs brought suit
against Napster for both contributory infringement (knowingly facilitating direct infringement by other users), and vicarious infringement
(supervising, controlling, and financially benefiting from the infringe48
ment of others). The court dealt with the issue of whether Napster,
because it maintained the indexing servers, had the ability, and there49
fore the obligation, to prevent infringement on its network. In response to these allegations, Napster sought refuge, like MP3.com, under the fair use doctrine, setting forth two possible scenarios that
50
should be considered “fair uses” of the Napster system.
The first argument proffered by Napster was that those uploading
and downloading files onto its system were “sampling” music in order
51
to decide whether they liked it enough to buy it. Under a sampling
rationale, Napster argued, record sales were actually increasing as a
result of people having access to the music and being able to listen to
52
it before they bought it. The court ultimately held that this argument
was unavailing, making the point that “sampling” affected the hither-

45

239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
See id. at 1011-13 (describing the mechanics of Napster’s P2P interface); Oberholzer &
Strumpf Report, supra note 37, at 6-7.
47 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012 (noting that “the Napster server software obtains the
Internet address of the requesting user and the Internet address of the ‘host user’ (the user with
the available files),” that the server then “communicate[s] the host user’s Internet address to the
requesting user.,” and that the “requesting user’s computer uses this information to establish a
connection with the host user and downloads a copy of the contents of the MP3 file from one
computer to the other over the Internet, ‘peer-to-peer.’”) (citations omitted).
48 Id. at 1019-22 (discussing Napster’s liability for contributory infringement); id. at 102224 (discussing Napster’s liability for vicarious infringement).
49 See id. at 1021 (reaffirming and applying to Napster a prior holding stating “that if a
computer system operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails
to purge such material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement.”).
50 Id. at 1017-19.
51 Id. at 1018.
52 Id. Both the district and appellate courts rejected Napster’s proffered evidence of increased record sales as a result of sampling, stating that evidence of “increased sales of copyrighted material attributable to unauthorized use should not deprive the copyright holder of the
right to license the material.” Id.
46
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to-untapped downloading market negatively, and reasoned that the
53
more “samples” were downloaded, the less music would be sold.
The second argument raised by Napster was that many of the individuals were merely grabbing digital copies of music that they already owned on CD in order to listen to that music on their comput54
ers. This “space shifting” rationale was also rejected by the court
because users did not merely copy CDs they owned by using Napster,
55
but they potentially made those CDs available to millions of people.
It was this availability that undermined the persuasiveness of the
“space shifting” argument, although it did not undermine the idea of
56
“space shifting” in and of itself.
Napster relied upon a central server to process and store requests
by users, so it was comparatively easy for the court to decide that the
company had constructive notice of infringing acts committed by users
57
of its network. In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, on the other hand,
presented a different scenario, and seems to have changed the balance
of what constitutes infringement. In Aimster, the court held that the
defendant was subject to contributory liability for infringing acts by
those on its network in spite of the fact that it had no actual know58
ledge of such acts. The court’s reasoning suggested that the defendant had willfully attempted to blind itself by designing its program in
a manner that prevented its distributor from examining the activities
59
of individual users. In his holding, Judge Richard Posner also noted
that:
It is not enough, as we have said, that a product or service
be physically capable . . . of a noninfringing use. Aimster has
failed to produce any evidence that its service has ever been
60
used for a noninfringing use . . . .
53 Id. This holding was made first by the district court and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.
See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 914 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
54 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
55 See id. (pointing out that “it is obvious that once a user lists a copy of music he already
owns on the Napster system in order to access the music from another location, the song becomes “available to millions of other individuals,” not just the original CD owner.”).
56 Id. But see Recording Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079
(9th Cir. 1999) (allowing a fair use defense based on space shifting where the plaintiff demonstrated that defendant’s product allowed people to rip tracks from their CDs in order to put
them on the defendant’s mp3 player).
57 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
58 See id. at 650-51 (holding that “that a service provider that would otherwise be a contributory infringer does not obtain immunity by using encryption to shield itself from actual knowledge of the unlawful purposes for which the service is being used.”).
59 Id. at 653 (surmising that “Aimster blinded itself in the hope that by doing so it might
[avoid liability]”).
60 Id.
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Thus, the burden seems to have been shifted to the producer of a
product in order to determine whether a user has engaged in a substantial noninfringing use. Under the court’s holding in Aimster, it
would seem that if actual infringing uses significantly outweigh actual
non-infringing uses, a product’s producer would be liable whether it
61
intended for those uses to occur or not. This seems to contravene the
standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Sony Corp.
62
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., which stated that in order to
defeat secondary liability, a product need only be capable of a “sub63
stantial noninfringing use.”
The standard set forth in Sony should have made Metro64
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. a foregone conclusion.
The technology in that case was different than the technologies in
both Napster and Aimster; and the defendants maintained no control
at all over the end-user’s use of its product once it reached the mar65
ket. The network developed by Grokster was a completely “decen66
tralized” model that consisted solely of end-users’ computers. Unlike
the defendant in Napster, Grokster did not have any control, and was
therefore not participating in infringement in the sense contemplated
67
by vicarious or contributory liability. Furthermore, it would have
been impossible, under the theory preferred in Aimster, to find that
Grokster had constructive notice of actual infringement using its
product because Grokster did not participate in any way in the use of
68
the product after it was downloaded from the company’s website. In
a nutshell, Grokster had created a product that had characteristics
61 Judge Posner also noted that the tutorials for the defendant’s product used nothing but
copyrighted music as examples of what could be uploaded and downloaded, which seems to
leave open the possibility, which is later explored by the United States Supreme Court in MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2768 (2005), that the manner in
which a given product is advertised can have a significant impact on the court’s legal view of the
purpose and possible uses of the product. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 652.
62 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
63 Id. at 789.
64 125 S. Ct. 2764.
65 See id. at 2772 (noting that “Grokster and StreamCast do not [] know when particular
files are copied”).
66 See id. at 2771; Oberholzer & Strumpf Report, supra note 36, at 6.
67 Compare Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774-75 (discussing the district and appellate court
analyses of the standards for contributory and vicarious liability and their impact on Grokster’s
secondary liability) with A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-24 (9th Cir.
2001) (applying the established standards of contributory and vicarious infringement to Napster).
68 Compare Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774-75 (conceding that it would be impossible for
Grokster to have knowledge of specific acts of infringement on its network) with In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that “Aimster’s server . . . collects
and organizes information obtained from the users,” making it possible, but for Aimster’s “willful blindness,” that it could have policed its own servers).
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legally similar to videocassette recorders, which Sony had long ago
69
held to be legal. Grokster’s arguments, in fact, sounded nearly identical to those made by the plaintiffs in Sony and were clearly depen70
dent on the protection offered under that standard. Grokster set out
to prove that at least a small portion of the music and media traded by
its users was in the public domain, so the act of uploading and downloading this music was a substantial noninfringing use that should
71
have saved it from liability altogether.
The Supreme Court, however, was not content to allow Grokster
to escape liability under the Sony standard. The Court imported a
new standard of liability from patent law in order to find Grokster
72
liable. Under the standard of “inducement” liability, a company or
individual could be liable for the infringement of those who use its
product if it could be shown that the company marketed the product
73
with the object to promote the copyright infringement of others. The
court brought up numerous examples showing that Grokster had fashioned itself as “the new Napster,” encouraging former Napster users
to switch to its service, and that it had sold advertisements on its
product with the understanding that it would be a draw to infringing
74
users. Thus, Grokster effectively engaged in a commercial use by
69 The similarity lies in the fact that, like Sony, Grokster did not have any control over
what the end users actually did with its product. It is one thing to say that those who have the
ability to prevent infringement have an obligation to do so, which would be the case with the
Napster and Aimster services, but like Sony, the only way for Grokster to control infringement
was to simply not distribute its P2P client at all.
70 In Grokster, the United States Supreme Court accuses lower courts of “misunderstanding” the standard for “substantial noninfringing uses” set forth in Sony. Compare Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (holding that to escape contributory liability, “a product need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses”), with Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774-75, 2778-79 (discussing how, by finding that Grokster was capable of a
“substantial noninfringing use,” the Ninth Circuit “misapplied” the Court’s holding in Sony). It
seems rather brusque of the Court to apply a hitherto-unknown standard of “inducement” liability in Grokster and to criticize the lower courts for applying what, at the time, was the only existing precedent. See id. at 2770 (holding, for the first time, “that one who distributes a device with
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties”).
71 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2785-86 (discussing the defendant’s “substantial noninfringing
use” argument).
72 Id. at 2779-80 (characterizing patent law’s “inducement rule [as] a sensible one for copyright . . . .”).
73 Id. at 2779.
74 This evidence of the defendant’s efforts to promote infringement included:

[i]nternal company documents indicat[ing] that StreamCast hoped to attract large
numbers of former Napster users if that company was shut down by court order or
otherwise, and that StreamCast planned to be the next Napster[; a] kit developed by
StreamCast to be delivered to advertisers [which] contained press articles about
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making a “market” out of copyright infringement that it knew would
75
occur under its network.
An important theme in the line of cases above is commercial
benefit. In each case, the defendants derived some kind of commercial
benefit from copying by users. It is important to make a distinction
here- P2P users may not be deriving a direct commercial benefit from
downloading songs. They are, at most, deriving an indirect benefit by
not having to buy CDs, and since people might download music for
free that they never would buy anyway, even that is arguably not the
76
case. The defendants, on the other hand, are all using the users’ behavior to make money. MP3.com used its library of copyrighted music
to sell advertisements on its website and point users towards sales of
CDs through its service; Napster, before its demise as a free-to-use file
sharing service, had received over $85 million in business loans based
77
on its technology; Aimster “enable[d] the member for a fee of $4.95 a
month to download with a single click the music most often shared by
78
Aimster users”; and Grokster sold a “potential market” of music
79
downloaders to its own advertisers. The Supreme Court’s Sony doctrine has not been applied yet to relieve P2P distributors of liability.
And it is arguably the inherent commerciality in each of these cases
80
that is a sticking point for the courts.
What can the preceding cases tell us about the current legality of
file sharing software? With respect to Internet file sharing, courts
seem to be playing a cat-and-mouse game with technology innovators.
StreamCast’s potential to capture former Napster users[;] and [evidence showing
that] it introduced itself to some potential advertisers as a company “which is similar
to what Napster was,” . . . . [In addition, StreamCast] broadcast banner advertisements to users of other Napster-compatible software, urging them to adopt its
OpenNap. . . . An internal e-mail from a company executive stated: “We have put this
network in place so that when Napster pulls the plug on their free service . . . or if the
Court orders them shut down prior to that . . . we will be positioned to capture the
flood of their 32 million users that will be actively looking for an alternative.
Id. at 2773 (citations omitted).
75 Id.
76 This is the crux of the “sampling” argument made by Napster. See Napster, 239 F.3d at
1018-19 (discussing Napster’s “sampling” fair use defense).
77 Brad
King,
Wired
News:
Last
Rites
for
Napster
(2002),
at
http://www.wired.com/news/busi-ness/0,1367,52532,00.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
78 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2003).
79 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2773.
80 On the other hand, Sony’s commercial relationship to user infringement was more protracted than any of the online file sharing services. As the Court noted, “private, noncommercial
time-shifting in the home[,]” the most statistically significant use of VTRs, “plainly satisfies” the
substantial noninfringing use standard. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 442 (1984). The court also noted that “primary use of the machine” for most owners was
this noninfringing time-shifting. Id. at 423.
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A new invention comes along; users use the invention to infringe; cop81
yright holders, unwilling to file suit against the users, file a suit
against the makers of the new technology under some kind of satellite
doctrine, such as contributory, vicarious or inducement liability; the
courts find a way, either by adopting existing precedent or importing
new concepts of liability, to hold the technology maker liable; and the
technology companies go back to the drawing board and create a new
invention that meets the qualifications set forth in the courts’ latest
precedent. The cycle could be endless, and the international nature of
the Internet makes the cost of enforcing these copyrights on a collective scale prohibitive and unwieldy. Because everyone in the world is
connected, and because a number of governments in the world have
82
different concepts of copyright, it may be impossible to ever fully (or
even reasonably) regulate copyrights over the Internet. How does
one preserve music copyright in a file-sharing environment? And if
we cannot stop people from sharing copyrighted material, in the
words of Professor Litman, how do copyright holders “compete with
83
free”? Is file sharing litigation essentially quixotic?
B. Proposed File Sharing Solutions
A number of solutions to file sharing liability have already been
proposed to balance out the interests of the parties involved and promote broader access to materials. They all have their faults, but they
are a good starting point for this discussion. The solutions proposed
so far can be broken down into two basic categories: those focused on
maintaining the status quo and those focused on imposing a levy or

81 The RIAA does file suits against individuals infringing on file-sharing networks. Obviously, however, the volume of suits is nowhere near the volume of users sharing copyrighted
material. See generally Nick Mamatas, Meet John Doe: The RIAA Runs Its Lawsuits as a Volume
Business, and Sometimes Downloaders Just Gotta Settle, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 7, 2005, at 34,
available at http://www.villagevoice.com/music/0510,mamatas,61813,22.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2006).
82 The European Union has a very different view of copyright, which is predicated on
“natural law.” GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 135-61 (discussing the philosophical and practical
differences between European and American visions of copyright law). “The natural law or
property right theory supports a different balancing of interests than does the [American] theory
and supports very long – even perpetual – copyright terms.” Dallon, supra note 2, at 443-44.
Professor Lawrence Lessig suggests that the divergence in our modern understandings of copyright law could, in an historical sense, be the result of the difference between viewing copyright
as a “property” right (which would seem to imply very broad “natural law” protection) and a
“monopoly” right (which would seem to imply “public interest” limitations on protection). See
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE – HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 88 (2004).
83 Litman, supra note 15, at 35.
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tax and distributing the proceeds based on how an expressive work
84
performs in the marketplace, be that marketplace digital or analog.
Many of the problems with maintaining the status quo should be
evident at this point. The copyright statute has simple terms for enforcement. In order to prove copyright infringement, one needs only
prove that a defendant (1) had access to the materials and (2) copied
85
them. But the provisions of the copyright statute itself and the
statements of the members of Congress involved in enacting it seem
to suggest, at least in passing, that the statute was principally designed
86
to prevent commercial infringement. When someone is making copies and selling them, the infringement is clear, but what happens when
one has the ability to create a potentially infinite number of perfect
copies of a given piece of music and wants no remuneration in return
for their distribution? As noted by Professor Litman:
Under our current system, immensely talented and hard
working composers and musicians, who create great stuff
that people would want to buy if they knew about it, are often unable to make a living making music, because the system we rely on to encourage the creation and dissemination
of music works best when its products are scarce. As a necessary corollary of a distribution mechanism that requires
significant investment of capital in order to deliver music to
consumers, that fact may be a regrettable but a reasonable
sacrifice at the altar of great music. Extending the lotterylike nature of today's conventional music market to a digital
world, though, where maintaining scarcity is more expensive
87
than tolerating ubiquity, is profoundly dysfunctional.
To put this point succinctly, a copyright statute that protects against
noncommercial distribution of music makes sense when one is trying
to encourage the creation and publishing of a given piece of media,
but not when there are no publishing or distribution costs to contend
88
with.

84

See id. at 32-34 (discussing various solutions to P2P file sharing proposed by legal scho-

lars).
85 See e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (noting
that infringement “may be inferentially proven by showing that Defendant . . . had access to the
allegedly infringed work . . . and that one of the rights statutorily guaranteed to copyright owners
is implicated by [his] actions.”); see 17 U.S.C. § 106, § 504 (2000).
86 See discussion infra Part III(b); see generally H.R. REP NO. 94-1476 (1976) (laying out
Congress’s understanding of the 1976 Copyright Act).
87 Litman, supra note 15, at 35.
88 See discussion infra Part III(c).
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Under the old model, Congress was given a Constitutional
mandate to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts” by
89
granting a statutory copyright monopoly. “Promoting progress,” in
the context of copyright, mandates that Congress employ its power to
grant limited statutory monopolies in a manner that encourages crea90
tion and dissemination. An artist is encouraged to create works, under the copyright clause, because if he creates something someone else
wants to buy, the artist will be able to make money from it, and the
law enforces his right to be the only person to do so. The only way the
artist can reap the benefits of the clause, however, is by disseminating
his work. It is important to realize that in the days before digital technology, the prospect or recording, marketing and distributing a work
91
for sale throughout the United States was daunting. Artists would
rarely have had the means to do this on their own, therefore publish92
ing companies were introduced into the mix. It was not only necessary for the law to protect the artist’s remuneration, but it also had to
offer enough of a benefit that the artist would have something to offer
a publisher in order to encourage dissemination. In this way, the “old”
copyright law protects publishers interests and artist’s interests together.
In a digital model, the additional remuneration the law formerly
offered to encourage publishing is no longer necessary. Publishing a
work on the Internet is now as easy as placing the file in a shared
folder on one’s hard drive. Effectively, the “marginal costs” associated
93
with music dissemination have disappeared. The only costs left are
94
the “fixed costs” of creation. Because artists, under the current sys-

89

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Litman, supra note 15, at 2; see generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281
(1970).
91 Litman, supra note 15, at 2.
92 Id.
93 A marginal cost is:
90

The additional cost needed to produce or purchase one more unit[s] of a good or
service. For example, if a firm can produce 150 units of a product at a total cost of
$5,000 and 151 units for $5,100, the marginal cost of the 151st unit is $100.
David L. Scott, Marginal Cost, WALL STREET WORDS: AN A TO Z GUIDE TO INVESTMENT TERMS
TODAY'S
INVESTOR
(2003),
available
at
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=marginal%20cost (last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
94 A fixed cost is:
FOR

[a] cost that remains unchanged even with variations in output. An airline with 20
airplanes has the fixed costs of depreciation and interest (if the planes are partially
financed with debt), regardless of the number of times the planes fly or the number
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tem, are rarely able to turn a profit off of the dissemination of their
recorded works, it seems implausible to suggest that the possibility of
financial gain from one’s recorded music serves as an incentive to cre95
ation.
A number of scholars have suggested that Congress deal with the
file-sharing dilemma by imposing taxes or levies on all kinds of different products and services. This levy or tax would then be divided according to a given formula and distributed to copyright holders. Pro96
fessor Neil Netanel suggests a “noncommercial use levy,” a fee imposed on products and services whose value is enhanced by P2P file
sharing, which could include iPods and other MP3-related devices,
blank CDs, computers, Internet access, and any number of other prod97
98
ucts. Professor Glynn Lunney concurs with Professor Netanel, but
would limit his levy to “equipment and blank storage media that ena99
ble . . . copying.” Professor Lawrence Lessig has proposed solutions
that involve registration of copyrighted works and unique copyright
ID tags that could be used to redistribute the income generated by a
tax on digital recording services, digital storage media and Internet
100
access services. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) has
offered its own solution—music companies offer fans a license to
101
share for a monthly fee.

of seats filled on each flight. Firms with high fixed costs tend to engage in price wars
and cutthroat competition because extra revenues incur little extra expense. These
firms tend to experience wide swings in profits.
David L. Scott, Fixed Cost, WALL STREET WORDS: AN A TO Z GUIDE TO INVESTMENT TERMS
TODAY’S
INVESTOR
(2003),
available
at
FOR
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=marginal%20cost (last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
95 Litman, supra note 15, at 31-32. Unfortunately, artists rarely turn a profit from their
recorded works. Singer Janis Ian posits that “everyone is forgetting the main way an artist becomes successful - exposure. Without exposure, no one comes to shows, no one buys CDs, no one
enables you to earn a living doing what you love.” Janis Ian, The Internet Debacle – An Alternative
View,
PERFORMING
SONGWRITER
MAG.,
Jun.
2002,
available
at
http://www.janisian.com/article-internet_debacle.html [hereinafter “Ian Article”].
96 Neil Netanel is currently a professor at U.C.L.A. His biography is available at
http://www.law.ucla.edu/home/index.asp?page=637 (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
97 See Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 43-44 (2003) (discussing which products should be taxed under
a noncommercial use levy).
98 Glynn Lunney is currently a professor at Tulane University, his biography is available at
http://www.law.tulane.edu/tuexp/facadmin/biotemplate.cfm?username=glunney&status=faculty
(last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
99 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 852-53 (2001).
100 LESSIG, supra note 82, at 300-04.
101 Electronic Frontier Foundation, A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of
Music File Sharing (Feb. 2004), available at http:// www.eff.org/share/collective_lic_wp.pdf.
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All of these solutions involving taxes and levies suffer from two
major shortfalls. First, taxes or levies on goods and services that can
be used for file sharing seem inappropriate, because those who purchase those goods or services but do not engage in file sharing, are
102
forced to subsidize those who do. The second problem with these
solutions is the redistribution mechanism. Whenever a tax or levy is
involved, someone is going to have to calculate percentages of wealth
and redistribute that income to artists. How should it be calculated
fairly? What if artists wish to opt out of the system? What if P2P
technology designers opt out? Artists and the public would trade the
costs of publishing music for the costs of keeping track of it. Such a
system, on a scale of millions (or possibly billions) of downloads may
become prohibitively expensive.
Perhaps the best solution is to accept the fact that noncommercial
P2P file sharing is here to stay. It is ubiquitous; it is growing, and it is,
to a large extent, impossible to regulate. The IITF’s “Celestial Jukebox” already exists, but no one is paying for it, and in all likelihood no
one ever will. Why are we concerned about denying the public, the
beneficiaries of the Copyright Clause, access to the works of artists,
the other beneficiaries of the Copyright Clause, when it is self evident
that this denial of access does not financially benefit the vast majority
of artists and will hamper our best tools for the dissemination of existing works?
In short, maybe it would be best if we just “leave them kids
alone.”
III. INFRINGEMENT: PROTECTING THE “MILKMEN OF THE DIGITAL
AGE”
A milkman is a person . . . who delivers milk in milk bottles
or cartons . . . . Originally, milk needed to be delivered to
houses on a daily basis as poor refrigeration meant it would
quickly spoil. The near-ubiquity of refrigerators in homes in
the developed world has decreased the need for frequent
milk delivery over the past half-century and made the pro-

102 Licensing ideas like the one proposed by the EFF have not gotten a warm reception
from industry insiders. RIAA vice president of government relations, David Sutphen, points out
two problems in the voluntary licensing scheme: first, users who agree to the licensing scheme
wind up subsidizing sharing by users who simply continue to participate in free downloading, and
second, the system essentially equalizes the value of all recorded music. Such a system, according
to Sutphen, “means that ‘Ice Ice Baby’ has as much value as the Beatles catalog does.” Lindsay
Martell, A License to Share: Group Proposes Music Licensing Scheme for Music File Networks,
ABCNEWS.COM,
March
1,
2004,
at
http://www.g4tv.com/techtvvault/features/47196/A_License_to_Download.html.
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fession shrink in many localities and disappear totally in
others. Additionally, milk delivery incurs a small cost on the
price of dairy products that is increasingly difficult to justify
103
....
There was a time when it made sense to have milkmen, they were
a spoke in the wheel of a dairy distribution system for which there was
no viable alternative. But as refrigeration technology improved, the
need for milkmen waned, and once that need disappeared, the occupation soon followed. The parallel of the milkman in our digital age is
the record label. At the time of the 1976 Copyright Act, there was no
such thing as “online,” let alone an “online music distribution mechanism.” It seemed logical to focus infringement law, at least with
respect to music, or “phonorecords,” as they are referred to by the
104
statute, around a business model which contemplated not only the
cost incurred by an artist in creating music but the cost incurred by a
publisher in distributing it.
In fact, the more closely one examines the history of copyright
law and the doctrine in its modern form, the more one sees that this
law, from its earliest roots, was designed to address the commercial
interests associated with publishing. What happens, however, when
existing copyright law comes into conflict with the “culture of free”?
Are the provisions of the 1976 Act adequately written to deal with the
realities of online file sharing? Or do the protections given to copyright holders under the 1976 Act really amount to a law that says we
have to use milkmen?
A. A Brief History of Copyright
In order to understand why copyright law is the way that it is and
how it could be understood differently in a P2P environment, it is important to get a sense of its history. From the printing press to the
VCR, copyright law has always been forced to change in response to
103 Wikipedia, Milkman, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milkman (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
The original record label-milkman analogy was made by author Matt Bai. Matt Bai, Hating
Hillary,
WIRED
MAG.
(Feb.
2003),
available
at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.02/hating_pr.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
104 The 1976 Copyright Act states that:

‘Phonorecords’ are material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying
a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
“phonorecords” includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (emphasis added).
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new methods of creation and dissemination, and throughout the history of copyright law, publishers’ interests and artists’ interest have been
essentially aligned; artists, in order to disseminate their work, needed
publishers, and publishers, in order to have work to disseminate,
needed artists.
The needs of artists and publishers, however, are not the only
needs enshrined in copyright’s history; in fact, they are not even the
primary needs, the primary beneficiary of copyright law has always
been the public interest. Under the old model, the public’s interest,
artist’s interest, and publisher’s interest aligned under a model that
used copyright terms in order to guarantee a large enough return on a
publisher’s investment to justify its risk in selecting an artist’s material
and disseminating it to the public. Under our new model, where the
publisher’s importance is vastly decreased because self-publishing by
artists is cheap and easy, historically sensible incentive schemes may
no longer be necessary.
1. The roots of copyright
Although the roots of our modern statutory copyright law are
105
English, there are conceptual antecedents dating back much further.
Jewish law, for instance, provides one of the first example of law that
could be regarded as protecting what we now know as the “public
domain,” by “endors[ing] and even command[ing] the faithful repro106
duction of scriptural and other texts.” This was seen as necessary
because these texts were a primary source of Jewish law, and the distribution of Jews throughout the world made it necessary to have
faithful reproductions in order to disseminate them to the population
107
and preserve them over a long period. Jewish law demanded two
things of those who would copy texts; it required that the texts be co108
pied faithfully, and it required attribution to the original author.
109
The earliest account of a copyright “case” comes from Ireland.
110
A monk named Columba visited his former instructor, Finnian, at a

105 See Dallon, supra note 2, at 369-402 (discussing historical antecedents to English and
American copyright law).
106 Id. at 372.
107 Id.; see generally MAX I. DIMONT, JEWS, GOD AND HISTORY (1962) (discussing Jewish
Diaspora and survival over the culture’s 4,000-year history).
108 See Dallon, supra note 3, at 372-73.
109 There is no surviving record, but the story is recounted in CHARLES FORBES
MONTALEMBERT, SAINT COLUMBA: APOSTLE OF CALEDONIA 18-21 (1898).
110 “Columba” would later become “Saint Columba,” a seminal figure in Irish history and
folklore. See generally id; Wikipedia, Saint Columba, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Columba
(last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
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111

monastery, and secretly copied a psalter. When Finnian learned of
112
this, he demanded that Columba give him the copy. Columba re113
fused, and the case was brought before the King. The King sided
with Finnian, holding “[t]o every cow her calf, and consequently to
114
every book its copy.” The King, looking at whether “one in rightful
possession of a manuscript ha[d] the right to copy it without permis115
sion of the manuscript’s owner,” answered “No.”
In spite of these early antecedents, what really drove the creation
of what we now know as copyright law was the invention of the printing press, which broke through the logistical concerns previously pre116
sented by copying manuscripts by hand. Gutenberg developed the
first printing press in Mainz, Germany around 1450 and published the
117
118
first printed book, the Gutenberg Bible, in 1455 or early 1456. The
printing press allowed the production and dissemination of literature
on a never-before seen scale. Thousands who previously were unable
to access any sort of literature because the cost involved in handcopying it made it prohibitively expensive could now afford such
works.
The printing press also placed economic pressure on a new and
119
powerful class of tradesmen, the publishers. The prospect of “publishing” a manuscript on any scale was an expensive one because it
involved a significant initial outlay for typesetting, raw materials, dis120
tribution and other costs associated with manufacturing books. A
major concern among publishers was that a second publisher could
buy a single copy of an initial publisher’s book, use his own press, print
a similar copy, and render the initial publisher (and potentially, the
121
second publisher) unable to recoup his investment. On the other
hand, the public benefit incurred by society from the broad dissemina111 MONTALEMBERT, supra note 109, at 18. A “psalter” is “a book containing the psalms
separately printed or esp[ecially] arranged for liturgical or devotional use . . . .” 2 WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1829 (1986).
112 Id. at 18.
113 Id. at 18-19.
114 Id. at 21.
115 Dallon, supra note 2, at 376.
116 Id. at 378.
117 For an overview of the Gutenberg Bible, which includes background on the invention of
the printing press and scans of the actual text of two editions of the original book, see Gutenberg
Bible:
View
the
British
Library’s
Digital
Versions
Online,
http://www.bl.uk/treasures/gutenberg/homepage.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
118 See N.F. BLAKE, CAXTON: ENGLAND’S FIRST PUBLISHER 4 (1976).
119 See Dallon, supra note 2, at 381 (noting that printers, “[b]y nature of the business, they
tended to be educated and well connected.”).
120 See id. (noting that printers would need “substantial financial backing to afford the
capital investment required to obtain and maintain a printing press and run a business.”).
121 Id. at 382.
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122

tion of these published books was enormous. Clearly, the printing of
books was an interest that was worthy of some kind of legal protection.
It was with both of these concerns in mind that governments soon
began to protect the interests of publishers by granting “specific privileges . . . to particular publishers for particular works and usually for
123
limited times.” This grant amounted to a narrow monopoly, which
put printers in a position where they could safely recoup their invest124
ments for a particular work without fear of piracy. Some licenses
also began to be granted to authors, giving them the right to choose
125
which printer would be authorized to print their work. The “printer’s license” was essentially an ad hoc arrangement, which soon began to present problems because over time, the licenses began to con126
flict with one another. Governments began moving toward a more
comprehensive solution to protecting the interests of authors and the
expenses incurred by printers. Statutes became necessary.
2. Statutory copyright In England
The modern statutory precursor to our current copyright law is
the Statute of Anne, which was enacted by the British Parliament in
127
1710. The purpose of the Statute was to promote the encouragement
of learning, and the method by which this purpose was achieved was
by granting authors limited property rights over the printing of their
128
books. The failure to grant these limited monopolies, as claimed by

122 This is the genesis of the “public benefit” rationale. Public access to printed works was
enabled by mass dissemination, which in turn was enabled by the printing press, which in turn
was arguably responsible for the renaissance and the protestant reformation. See generally
EISENSTEIN, supra note 20.
123 Dallon, supra note 2, at 383.
124 See id. at 382.
125 See id. at 383-84 (describing an exclusive right granted by Venetian authorities to the
author Marcus Antonius Sabellicus to authorize a printing of his history of Venice; this is arguably the first such right granted to an author).
126 The government in Venice:

granted numerous privileges but some were conflicting or ambiguous. One privilege
was granted but identified neither the protected title nor author. Other privileges
were obtained in bad faith – where the privilege holder had no intention of publishing the work, but rather intended to extract payment for the rights, or simply intended to prevent others from publishing the work.
Id. at 385-86 (footnote omitted).
127 LESSIG, supra note 82, at 86.
128 The statute’s preamble spells out these goals unmistakably. See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8
Ann., c. 18 (Eng.), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html.
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129

English author Daniel Defoe, would result in “a Discouragement to
Industry, a Dishonour to Learning, and a Cheat upon the whole Na130
tion.” Although the Statute of Anne granted the limited monopoly
that Defoe and his contemporaries pleaded for, it did so with significant limitations. The grant of monopoly under the Statute lasted, in
131
the case of new works, for only 14 years. Another significant limitation was the purpose of the act itself, which is enshrined in its characterization by Parliament as “[a]n act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchas132
ers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.” The “encouragement of learning” via the dissemination of works and encouragement of new works was the foremost concern of British Parlia133
ment, not necessarily the property rights of the authors.
This distinction played itself out in the case of Donaldson v.
Beckett, where the King’s Bench affirmed that the protections extended to authors under the Statute of Anne subsumed any copyrights
which may have existed under common law before the Statute was
134
passed. Similarly, in Newbery’s Case, the court held that an act of
abridgment, where the defendant had abridged and published Hawkesworth’s novel Voyages, Newbury was not only exculpated from
liability for copyright infringement but was congratulated for reducing
the size of Hawkesworth’s novel and presenting it in a more readable
135
fashion. This rule condoning “fair abridgment,” coupled with the
rejection of a common law extension of the statutory monopoly
granted to copyright holders, seemed to place the public’s interest in
getting access to information in front of the author’s or publisher’s
interest in having an exclusive right to his work.
3. Constitutional copyright in the United States
The United States Constitution is the basis of our understanding
of copyright law. It creates power in Congress to “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
129 Daniel Defoe is best known to history as the author of Robinson Crusoe. See Wikipedia,
Daniel Dafoe, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Defoe (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
130 Dallon, supra note 2, at 404. Note that this claim seems disingenuous on Defoe’s part. It
does not appear that the lack of a law like the Statute of Anne discouraged him from becoming
an author.
131 Statute of Anne, supra note 128.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Donaldson v. Beckett, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (K.B. 1774); see generally GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 6, at 38-40; LESSIG, supra note 82, at 92-94.
135 See Newbery’s Case, 98 Eng. Rep. 913 (Ch. 1773); see also John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair
Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 479-480 (2005).
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Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
136
and Discoveries.” Like the Statute of Anne, the delegates of the
Constitutional convention created a law that represented a combination of a “purpose,” “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts” and a “method,” which is to secure “for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
137
and Discoveries.” In The Federalist #43, James Madison stated that
“[t]he utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright
of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right
138
of common law . . . . The public good fully coincides . . . with the
139
claims of individuals.”
Although this clause was approved unanimously, it actually
represents an amalgamation of several clauses proposed by numerous
140
delegates of the Constitutional Convention. The existing Copyright
141
Clause was originally two clauses. One vested a power in Congress
to “secure literary authors their copy rights for a limited time,” and
the other vested a power to “encourage . . . the advancement of useful
knowledge and discoveries,” to “grant patents for useful inventions,”
and to “secure the inventors of useful machines and implement the
142
benefits thereof for a limited time.” These goals, which relate to
both copyrights and patents, were all combined for the purposes of
143
Article I, section 8, clause 8.
In spite of their votes, many of the Founding Fathers were concerned that the application of the Copyright Clause be balanced in
order to achieve the maximum public benefit. Madison shared his
concerns about the monopolistic nature of copyright in a letter to
Thomas Jefferson, opining that monopolies “are justly classed among
the greatest nusances [sic] in Government. But is it clear that as encouragements to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not
144
too valuable to be wholly renounced?” Jefferson, in his letters, ex-

136

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Compare Statute of Anne, supra note 128, with U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
138 Madison is arguably incorrect on this point, as is indicated in Donaldson. See Donaldson,
98 Eng. Rep. at 257 (holding that either (1) a perpetual common law copyright does not exist, or
(2) the Statute of Anne superseded whatever common law protection authors had).
139 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
140 See I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS – SCIENCE IN THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 239-40 (1995) (detailing the underpinnings of the Copyright Clause and subsequent revisions thereof).
141 Id. at 240.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, at 566 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995); see also Dallon, supra
137
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pressed a dim view of the idea that the Constitution should intrinsical145
ly support grants of monopoly. Both, however, seemed to recognize
that society could derive a great public benefit from authors and inventors under a proper and balanced application of the Copyright
Clause.
Although the “public benefit rationale” was the clear underlying
purpose of the Copyright Clause, scholars have proposed an alternate
146
understanding, a “natural law” or “property rights” rationale, which
is more in keeping with old Irish pronouncement of “to every cow her
147
calf, and to every book its copy.” However, even the most ardent
supporters of a “natural law” theory of copyright understood, at the
time of the Constitutional Convention and for years beyond, that the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution did not support their view of
148
intellectual property rights. Noah Webster, a staunch supporter of
the “natural law” theory of copyright, reluctantly admitted that, since
Donaldson, “it seems to have been generally admitted that an author
has not a permanent and exclusive right to the publication of his orig149
inal works at common law.”
Congress enacted the first copyright statute in 1790, which was
entitled “[a]n Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the
copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of
150
such copies, during the times therein mentioned.” Some commentators have suggested that, in spite of the clear language in the title of
the Act, Congress merely thought it was giving statutory effect to an
151
existing right.
The Supreme Court, however, specifically rejected
152
this assertion in Wheaton v. Peters, holding that any property rights
of owners possessed to unpublished manuscripts under the common
153
law were extinguished upon publication. After a manuscript was
note 3, at 424-25 (summarizing the correspondences between Madison and Jefferson involving
copyright).
145 See id. at 425-26.
146 For more detailed explanations of the “natural law” theory of copyright, see generally
Tehranian, supra note 135, at 481; Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right In Self-Expression: Equality And Individualism In The Natural Law Theory of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533
(1993); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 517, 523-24 (1990).
147 MONTALEMBERT, supra note 109, at 21. See also discussion supra Part III(a).
148 Noah Webster is best-known by history as the man responsible for the creation of the
Merriam-Webster
Dictionary.
See
Wikipedia,
Noah
Webster,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noah_Webster (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
149 LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER 418 (Harry R. Warfel, ed., 1953).
150 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790), available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/1790act.pdf (emphasis added).
151 Dallon, supra note 2, at 427.
152 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
153 Id. at 121-22.
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published, the only protection afforded to the author and publisher
154
was that provided by the Act.
The House Reports to revisions of the copyright statutes in 1909,
and case law decided in the wake of the 1976 Act, continued to recognize the “public benefit” as the principal rationale for the copyright
155
privilege. The Supreme Court and the circuit courts of appeal continued to invoke this language in their opinions dealing with copyright
156
issues. The first real philosophical shift in Congress’ thinking occurred in 1998, with the passing of the CTEA, an amendment to the
157
Copyright Act of 1976. The CTEA extended all of the time periods
158
involved in copyright considerably, which arguably contradicts the
“public purpose” rationale; but the real significance of the CTEA was
the underlying reasoning involved. For the first time, Congress seems
to have recognized a “natural law” theory of copyright privilege over
its constitutionally mandated and long-pedigreed “public purpose”
159
rationale.
The Senate report on the passage of the CTEA discloses four
main purposes for the passage of the act: (1) the harmonization of U.S.
patents and copyrights with those in the EU, (2) the favorable impact
this longer recognition would have on trade with other countries, (3)
fairness to the authors, and (4) the stimulation of new works and the
160
preservation of existing historical works. These final two justifica-

154

Id.
“The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings . . . but upon the
ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will
be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.”
H.R. Rep. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909), quoted in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 n.10 (1984); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 580 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222).
156 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (noting that the “difficult balance between the interests of
authors and inventors [lies] in [protecting] the control and exploitation of their writings and
discoveries on the one hand, and [protecting] society's competing interest in the free flow of
ideas, information, and commerce on the other. . . .”).
157 CTEA, 112 Stat. at 2827.
158 See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 2-3 (1996). The CTEA:
155

amended the Copyright Act of 1976 . . . by extending the duration of existing and future copyrights by twenty years. The term of copyright for new works generally went
from the life of the author plus fifty years, to the life of the author plus seventy years.
The term of copyrights for works made for hire was also increased by twenty years,
resulting in a term of the shorter of ninety-five years from publication or 120 years
from creation.
Dallon, supra note 2, at 437 (footnotes omitted).
159 Id.
160 See S. REP. NO. 104-315 at 3.
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tions are most concerning for proponents of the “public purpose” rationale of copyright, and are indicative of an overall paradigm shift in
Congressional attitudes towards copyright in general.
The “fairness” argument is clearly (and mistakenly) rooted in a
“natural law” theory of copyright. In spite of the official statement by
Congress that its understanding of the term “limited times” requires it
to ensure that copyright holders should be allowed to pass their copyrights down through at least one if not two generations of descen161
dants, Professor Dallon rightly observes that:
American copyright law has never attempted to ensure
copyright protection to benefit the author and two full generations of the author’s descendents. The concept of ensuring protection for an author’s grandchildren is literally foreign to American copyright law and ironically was imported
from the European Union Directive from 1993. Significantly, continental European copyright law has a different theoretical basis than American copyright law; continental European copyright law is premised on the natural law property right theory of copyright rather than a utilitarian public
benefit theory. The natural law or property right theory
supports a different balancing of interests than does the
public benefit theory and supports very long—even perpe162
tual—copyright terms.

161 See id. at 10-11. This reasoning is even criticized within the Senate Report itself. Senator
Brown notes that:

[t]he phrase ‘‘limited times’’ has never been defined by the courts. Both the Register
of Copyrights and the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks argue that life-plus70 years is a limited time. The Register of Copyrights suggests it is within the discretion of Congress to determine what constitutes a limited time. We do have an idea of
what ‘‘limited times’’ meant to the drafters of the Constitution: the original grants of
copyright extended for a time far shorter than the extreme position taken in this bill.
The length of the term is so long that it invites a court review.
Id. at 33. The Senator also posits that:
[t]he real incentive . . . is for corporate owners that bought copyrights to lobby Congress for another 20 years of revenue—not for creators who will be long dead once
this term extension takes hold. Do you know any creator that would fail to create if
the monopoly grant ran out at life-plus-50 years of protection rather than life-plus-70
years? Would Hemingway have produced another work if he were guaranteed
another 20 years of copyright protection? Would Wyeth have painted more? Would
Sinatra have sang more? This suggestion is ludicrous.
Id. at 32.
162 Dallon, supra note 2, at 443-44 (footnotes omitted).
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The argument that an extension of copyright terms would stimulate the production of new works and preserve existing works is also
based on a set of mistaken premises. The first part of this argument
assumes that the sole motivation for creating expressive works is in163
come. Even if generating income is a primary motivation for the
artist, it seems unlikely that an extension of copyright to 70 years after
his death would provide an incentive to create more or better works
164
than he would have otherwise. The second part of this argument is
also countermanded by experience dating back to Jewish law showing
that works may be better preserved by copying them as much as poss165
ible, or at least without restraint. In short, at least two of the premises upon which the CTEA is based seem to derogate the “public benefit” rationale envisioned by the Founding Fathers and enshrined in the
Copyright Clause. The public is hardly served by allowing copyright
holders to hoard their works from the public for longer than necessary.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ratified Congress’s reasoning in
166
Eldred v. Ashcroft. Applying a rational basis test to Congress’s extension of copyright terms, the Court held that “it is generally for
Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright
167
Clause’s objectives.” As a result of this ruling, Congress has for the
most part been left to its own devices. Congress gets to decide for
itself what the Copyright Clause means, and needs only provide some
rational reason for any modification it makes to existing copyright

163

See discussion infra Part III(b).
See S. Rep. No. 104-315 at 33.
165 “Endorsing and commanding faithful copying of texts” was one way the Judaism has
been able to exist for 4,000 years in spite of its extreme diaspora. See generally DIMONT, supra
note 108. One entertainment industry insider opined that:
164

[w]hatever work is not owned is a work that no one protects and preserves. . . . There
is no one who will invest the funds for enhancement because there is no longer an
incentive to rehabilitate and preserve something that anyone can offer for sale. A
public domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its life. But everyone
exploits its use, until that time certain when it becomes soiled and haggard, barren of
its previous virtues. How does a consumer benefit from the steady decline of a film's
quality?
The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 42 (1995). Obviously, history and experience seem to suggest precisely the
opposite regarding the public domain’s ability to preserve works for posterity. Aside from the
Hebrew law governing the copying of texts, it is worth noting that “classic” novels and other
works that have long-since passed into the public domain continue to be successfully and profitably reprinted and marketed in spite of the fact that these works can be exploited by anyone.
166 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
167 Id. at 212.
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168

law. If Congress chooses to adopt a “natural law” theory that promotes the private interests of artists over the public interest in having
access to useful works, there is little, from a constitutional standpoint,
that any court can do to stop it. It is important to note that choosing
to apply this test was not necessarily a mistake by the Supreme Court.
The Court saw this as a simple case of how much it should infringe on
a power constitutionally given to Congress, and chose to apply a standard of rational review that is frequently applied in the case of Article
169
I powers. The issue, however, is how Eldred affects the underlying
premise that copyright protections are intended primarily for the
“public benefit” and not primarily for the “private benefit” of the artist.
All of this leaves us with two important points. First of all, copyright law was developed primarily to meet the needs of printers, publishers and distributors. Whether this is because governments were
interested in the idealistic goal of having a ready supply of books
available for their citizens, or the more sinister goal of controlling
what books citizens would ultimately be able to read, one thing is
clear: the benefits provided, historically, were not just designed to
compensate artists, they were provided so that artists would be able to
persuade publishers to make a capital investment with a governmentendorsed monopoly.
The second major point is narrower. The Copyright Clause of the
U.S. Constitution is, like the rest of that document, designed to be selflimiting. In the United States, the government-endorsed monopoly
power is (or should be) only as good as the expressive creation it incentivizes. Where the monopoly is not incentivizing creation and dissemination or where the monopoly is disincentivizing creation and
dissemination, this may even suggest that even under an Eldred standard, the grant of monopoly is irrational. This understanding is consistent with the understanding of the Founding Fathers.

168 In the Senate Reports on the CTEA, Congress elaborated on its four principal justifications, stating that:

[t]he question of exactly what term of protection most appropriately reflects a ‘‘limited time’’ as envisioned by the Founders has been debated since the enactment of
the first Copyright Act in 1790, and is likely to continue to be debated into the foreseeable future. Congress has long accepted the general principal, however, that copyright should protect the author and at least one generation of heirs.
S. REP. NO. 104-315 at 10.
169 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208 (declaring that once “we find that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments
of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”).
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The Copyright Clause is designed to primarily benefit the public,
followed, in a limited sense, by the artists. Copyright holders like
record companies were important beneficiaries who were worth protecting when they served the public interest by disseminating music to
the public, but like milkmen, their importance has waned with the advent of P2P file sharing. Now, instead of being a necessary spoke in a
music distribution system, they stand in its way, waving copyrights that
were designed for a pre-P2P world and litigating furiously against
those who recognize their irrelevance.
B. Commercial Copying: The Heart of Infringement
As was discussed in the previous section, copyright law, at its historical core, is rooted in the commercial interest of publishing. What
makes P2P file sharing unique in the history of copyright law is not
only its ability to copy, but its ability to disseminate without the need
for any kind of publishing. The historical record demonstrates that a
major focus of copyright law from its inception has been to protect the
interests of publishers, because the protection of those interests was
the surest route to dissemination. In the digital age, there is, for the
first time, no significant cost associated with dissemination; and the
job that used to belong to a publishing house now belongs to every
person who uploads and downloads music. In effect, the needs of artists, the public, and the publishers are no longer really aligned because
publishers impose what amounts to a surplus cost on music recordings
that is no longer needed to ensure dissemination.
The 1976 Act takes very well-defined and comprehensive steps to
170
prevent commercial piracy of “phonorecordings,” but it is important
to remember that the environment we are in now is one that was not
contemplated by the drafters of the act in 1976. At that time, it was
probably assumed that almost all piracy would have an inherently
commercial character. After all, who would go through the time and
effort of pressing and packaging an album in order to just give it away
to people? Naturally, this behavior didn’t really make sense in a nondigital environment, so it was probably not foremost on the minds of
the drafters of the 1976 Act.
This emphasis on underlying commerciality receives support
from several sources in the 1976 Act, which provides a number of exceptions to infringement based on uses that are private and not strictly
171
commercial. Often uses made for what is considered a “public” pur170

The Copyright statute defines this term. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000) (exempting private secondary transmissions within businesses where such transmissions are not being sold); 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2000) (exempting second171
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pose, such as library-based copying, are not considered infringing.
An excellent example of this kind of exception-making is section
602(a)(2) of the 1976 Act, which dictates that:
importation, for the private use of the importer and not for
distribution, by any person with respect to no more than
one copy or phonorecord of any one work at any one time,
or by any person arriving from outside the United States
with respect to copies or phonorecords forming part of such
person’s personal baggage. . . . is not an act of infringe173
ment.
This has two significant effects in a P2P file-sharing context. First,
what if the party offering the upload is international? Doesn’t that
relieve the downloading party, who is downloading “no more than one
copy . . . of any one work at any one time[,]” from liability under the
exception? Is downloading importation within the meaning of the
copyright clause? There is no case law on this point, but it would certainly seem plausible.
The second effect is on direct sites that offer music for download,
like Allofmp3.com, and its different-in-name-only descendant,
174
Mp3Sparks.com. Allofmp3.com operated in a “grey area” with re175
spect to the legitimacy of its service to Russian downloaders. The
owners of the site claimed ownership of their files by virtue of the fact
that Russian copyright law gave them the right, as owners of Russian
radio stations, to “broadcast” their music on the Web and through ra176
dio waves.
Russian authorities said the service provided by the
177
company is illegal, and eventually shut down Allofmp3.com. The

ary transmissions of superstations and public broadcasting stations for private home viewing); 17
U.S.C. § 602 (2000) (exempting importation of otherwise infringing nondramatic musical works
for the private use of the owner).
172 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000) (providing a special set of exemptions for photocopying
by libraries); 17 U.S.C. § 407 (2000) (allowing “deposit” exceptions for the library of Congress);
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000) (allowing reduced statutory damages for library employees acting
within the scope of their employment).
173 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2) (2000).
174 AllofMP3 Home Page, http://www.allofmp3.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2006); Mp3Sparks
Home Page, http://mp3sparks.com/ (last visited May 29, 2008). Russian authorities ultimately
agreed to shut down AllofMP3.com because it presented a stumbling block to the country’s
WTO membership. Mp3Sparks sprung up days later, with exactly the same content, and has
been running ever since. See Mike Masnick, RIAA Drops Allofmp3 Lawsuit; Pretends
Mp3Sparks
Doesn't
Exist,
TECHDIRT
(May
27,
2008),
available
at
http://techdirt.com/articles/20080527/0044331223.shtml.
175 Dana Malhauser, Barely Legal – The Hottest Trend in File Sharing, SLATE (Mar. 28
2005), available at http://www.slate.com/id/2115868/.
176 See id.
177 See id.; but see, supra, note 174.
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service charged roughly a penny a megabyte to download copies of
178
popular artists from the United States and Europe. Naturally, it is
unclear whether any part of that cost was distributed to copyright
holders, since the site existed in Russia, but it was (and is) likely that
Allofmp3.com (and, for that matter, Mp3Sparks.com) is just working
within the confines of a compulsory licensing system very different
from our own. Once again, does the “importation exception” make
downloading “no more than one copy. . . of any one work at any one
179
time” legal under our 1976 concepts of infringement? It would certainly seem so.
There are really only two possible conclusions that can be drawn
from the presence of section 602(a)(2) in the Copyright Act: either (1)
the Act is simply not that concerned about private noncommercial
importation of music, or (2) the writers of the Act did not really consider the impact of a large scale, online importation system, and therefore they did not deal with it. In either sense, it would seem that the
Copyright Act of 1976 is ill-equipped to deal with the realities of the
file-sharing controversy.
Another example of the Act’s deficiencies is the statutory penalty
imposed for infringement. The Copyright Act gives copyright holders
the option to recover actual damages plus defendant’s profits made by
an infringer, or forego those damages in favor of statutory damages.
One would assume that a need for statutory damages would arise
where actual damages were difficult or impossible to prove, but they
are unfortunately available, like an unconscionable liquidated damages clause, where little or no actual damages have occurred.
Section 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act guarantees statutory damages, should a plaintiff elect them, of “a sum of not less than $750 or
more than $30,000 as the court considers just.” Consider the amount
of actual damages that may exist with respect to the downloading of a
single CD: $15.99 per CD, divided across 13 songs on that CD, is about
$1.23 per song. Allowing the plaintiff to elect statutory damages of
$750 per song or per album, when actual damages could easily be calculated at somewhere between $1.23 and $15.99, seems excessive.
Even under Eldred’s rational review standard, these damages may not
survive. One argument in favor of these large statutory penalties
might be that they act as deterrents, but if the effect of a deterrent is
to force a beneficiary of the copyright clause, the public, to pay an extra amount of money which is not ultimately going to wind up in the

178

See generally AllofMP3.com Home Page, http://www.allofmp3.com (last visited Mar. 11,

2006).
179

17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2) (2000).
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hands of the artist, aren’t we really asking the public, via the statutory
penalty, to subsidize an outmoded means of production?
The existence of the a statutory penalty of this magnitude forces
us to consider two possible conclusions: Perhaps the size of the damage provision is due to the fact that it was designed primarily to deter
commercial pirates, therefore it would not be applicable to a noncommercial downloader; or perhaps Congress simply did not anticipate how the Act would function in a digital culture, and therefore
the act is ill-equipped to deal with these questions. In either case,
there is evidence within the Copyright Act itself that allows us to conclude that its statutory provisions may not be the best guide to interpreting copyright law, perhaps it would be better to rely on the underlying policies of copyright law to guide our conclusions.
C. The Beneficiaries that Weren’t: Artists and the Public
As noted above, the Constitution is the root of our copyright, and
the Copyright Clause itself neatly demonstrates that the copyright
holder’s statutory monopoly is granted in order “to promote the
180
progress of science and the useful arts.” The clause therefore demonstrates a “purpose” of promoting progress and a “method” of granting
181
copyrights for limited times. The main problem with the “natural
law” theory of copyright, which seems to have been adopted by Con182
gress in the passing of the CTEA, is that it confuses the purpose with
the method. The statutory monopoly is not an end in and of itself. It
is a means of encouraging creation by artists and dissemination by
(until now) publishers.
There are really only two ways to promote the “progress” of the
useful arts in a manner that benefits society: works must be created
and works must be broadly disseminated. These goals seem antithetical, after all, the best way to maximize dissemination would be to
make all works available for free, while theoretically, the best way to
maximize the incentive for creation would be to protect works in per183
petuity. It is important, however, to remember that the Founding
Fathers did not care for monopolies in general, and at least some of
them had their reservations about a government-backed statutory

180

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Dallon, supra note 2, at 367-68.
182 The CTEA is addressed in detail in Part III(a) of this comment.
183 Perpetual protection (or even longer protection terms) may in fact encourage less works
by successful artists. Shorter Copyrights could “inspire” artists to create new works to replace
their income from expiring copyrights.
181
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184

monopoly for copyright holders. But the Copyright Clause was ultimately approved because the Founding Fathers thought that the
monopoly would be used for the public benefit.
Looking at the current state of the record industry, the concerns
of the Founding Fathers seem (pardon the pun) well-founded. This
industry has had every kind of consumer complaint lodged against it
185
over the years: including widespread payola scandals, and antitrust
litigation for, among other things, fixing the price of CDs in order to
186
charge the public an unfair rate. It is clear that the record industry
does not exactly act, of its own accord, with the best interests of its
public at heart. At the other end of the spectrum, artists have com187
plained about the unfair nature of recording contracts for years.
Even the standard industry contract hardly puts the artist at any kind
188
of advantage right out of the gate. In the words of artist Courtney
Love:
[s]omewhere along the way, record companies figured out
that it's a lot more profitable to control the distribution system than it is to nurture artists. And since the companies
didn't have any real competition, artists had no other place
to go. Record companies controlled the promotion and
marketing; only they had the ability to get lots of radio play,
and get records into all the big chain store[s]. That power

184 See THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS supra note 144, at 566; COHEN, supra note 140, at 23940; See also infra notes 137-144 and accompanying text.
185 See Eric Boehlert, Will Congress tackle pay-for-play?, SALON (Jun. 25 2002), available at
http://www.salon.com/ent/feature/2002/06/25/pfp_congress/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
186 See Barry Willis, FTC: No More Minimum Advertised Pricing on CDs, STEREOPHILE
(May 14 2000) (last visited Mar. 11, 2006) (detailing the record industry’s agreement to rescind is
“MAP” program of retail price-fixing). Unfortunately, the Justice Department does not seem to
be able to stop the record industry from engaging in antitrust violations. For a more current
version of this issue, see Sue Ziedler, DOJ opens probe into online music pricing, REUTERS (Mar.
3, 2006).
187 In fact, the most successful artists who are making serious amounts of money in the
music business do so principally through live concerts and brand-building, not the sale of records.
Rolling Stone Editor Joe Levy notes that “[t]he biggest-selling artists [in terms of record sales]
aren't the ones who make the most money. The artists learn the hard way that money comes
from concert tickets and T-shirts, not selling records.” John Leland, Balding Rockers and Big
Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13 2005, at 4.7.
188 See Steve Albini, The Problem with Music, http://www.negativland.com/albini.html
(criticizing the way the record industry deals with its artists) (last visited Mar. 16, 2006); see also
Future of Music Coalition, Major Label Contract Clause Critique (Oct. 3, 2001), available at
http://www.futureofmusic.org/contractcrit.pdf (conducting a point-by-point examination of a
major label contract for clauses biased in favor of record companies over artists) (last visited
Mar. 16, 2006).
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put them above both the artists and the audience. They own
189
the plantation.
Artist Janis Ian puts this problem into a more personal perspective, pointing out that “in 37 years as a recording artist, I've created
25+ albums for major labels, and I've never once received a royalty
190
check that didn't show I owed them money.”
This is the price that the public and the artist pays for an “oldstyle” physical dissemination network. It is a price that is too high in
an environment where the primary function of the record label is no
longer necessary. Of course, it is not up to the courts to change the
statutes. Under the United States Supreme Court’s precedent in Eldred, courts can only subject congressional interpretations of the Copyright Clause like the 1976 Act to “rational review.” While this level
of review may be enough to overturn the excessive penalties provided
by the Act, it is doubtful the court will adopt a new meaning of what
constitutes infringement in the digital environment.
IV.

FAIR USE: INCENTIVES, ACCESS, AND THAT SILLY OLD
CONSTITUTION

Fortunately, interpretations of the copyright clause are not left
completely to the whims of Congress. Courts, over time, have developed the doctrine of “fair use” to undo the harshness of the statutory
copyright regime when necessary. Principally defined as a “privilege
in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without consent, notwithstanding the mo191
nopoly granted to the owner[,]” this doctrine has co-evolved with
copyright doctrine over time. As new technologies have emerged, fair
use has been allowed to evolve—as a defense to a copyright infringement claim—to encompass the use of technologies in a manner beneficial to society at large.
A. Historical Precursors to Fair Use
Historical antecedents constituting what could be termed as a fair
use argument go as far back as medieval Ireland. Although no official
record exists in the matter of Finnian v. Columba, historians have
noted that Columba’s defense to Finnian’s claim that he had made an

189 Courtney Love, Address at Digital Hollywood Online Entertainment Conference (May
16, 2000), available at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/06/14/love/ (last visited Mar. 16
2006).
190 Ian Article, supra note 95.
191 HORACE BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944).
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unauthorized copy of his old master’s psalter was essentially that such
192
copying should be considered a fair use. Columba pointed out that:
Finnian’s book has not decreased in value because of the
transcript I made from it; also that it is not right to extinguish the divine things it contained, or to prevent me or anybody else from copying it, or reading it, or circulating it
throughout the provinces. I further maintain that if I benefited by its transcription, which I desired to be for the general good, provided no injury accrued to Finnian or his book
193
thereby, it was quite permissible for me to copy it!
“Fair use” also figured prominently in English interpretations of
the Statute of Anne. Both Newbery’s Case and Donaldson v. Beckett
illustrated the English Courts’ willingness to get involved in balancing
the public benefit provided by a work with the harshness of the copyright statute. The rule under English common law was called the “fair
abridgment” rule, and, not surprisingly, it applied to abridgments only,
which were seen as enhancing the public benefit offered by a particu194
lar work.
The American doctrine of fair use emerged in the case of Folsom
195
In Folsom, the defendant, writing a biography of George
v. Marsh.
Washington, used a number of previously unpublished letters the
plaintiff had procured and published in his own biography of the late
196
president. The defendant did not engage in verbatim copying of the
plaintiff’s novel; he merely used the letters as “ingredients” in his own
work, which Justice Story characterized as “an exceedingly valuable
197
book.” Ultimately, the court set forth a set of criteria that would be
used to decide whether a “fair use” should be applied to a given case
in the future, stating that:
[i]n short, we must often . . . look to the nature and objects
of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree to which the use may prejudice
the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of
198
the original work . . . .

192 See LUCY MENZIES, SAINT COLUMBA OF IONA: A STUDY OF HIS LIFE, HIS TIMES, & HIS
INFLUENCE 25 (1920).
193 Id. (this argument was ultimately unsuccessful).
194 See Newbery’s Case, 98 Eng. Rep. at 913 (congratulating Newbery for reducing Hawkesworthe’s work to a more portable and readable form).
195 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
196 Id. at 346.
197 Id. at 348.
198 Id.

272

FIU Law Review

[3:235

This statement represents the foundation of the “four factors” that
courts will look to in determining whether there is a fair use defense
199
to a copyright infringement claim.
In spite of the fact that Justice Story laid out the fundamentals of
fair use in Folsom, a number of scholars have claimed that he engaged
in what amounted to a “natural law” interpretation of copyright which
was not supported by the history of “fair abridgment” or the underly200
ing “public benefit” of the copyright clause. Justice Story, in his holding, noted prominently that “"[t]he entirety of the copyright is the
property of the author; and it is no defense, that another person has
201
appropriated a part, and not the whole, of any property.” Justice
Story showed little regard for the public benefit that could be derived
from the defendant’s copying of the plaintiff’s work. By emphasizing
the property rights and limiting the application of fair use to what
could be termed only as a “productive use,” Justice Story went against
the venerable English common law tradition that served as the basis
of the Constitutional Copyright Clause. Professor Tehranian notes
that “Story’s legal analysis shows little regard for the potential benefit
that dissemination of the allegedly infringing work may have for society[,]” which, if one takes the Copyright Clause seriously, should be
202
a fundamental consideration in any analysis of fair use. In spite of
these scholarly criticisms of the Court’s analysis in Folsom, the fair use
rationale set forth by Justice Story has been consistently applied and
expounded upon in future cases and in future congressional acts.
B. Noncommercial Activity: Fair Use under the 1976 Act
The factors listed by the court in Folsom have been codified by
203
Congress in the Copyright Act of 1976. Congress set forth four factors that must all be considered by the court in the adoption of a fair
use defense:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3)
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the . . . work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use

199
200
201
202
203

See discussion infra Part IV(b).
See Tehranian, supra note 135, at 481.
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) ( No. 4,901) (emphasis added).
Tehranian, supra note 135, at 482.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
204
work.
These four factors were not intended by Congress to be exclusive,
and courts have been given license to consider any other factors they
205
may deem relevant on a case-by-case basis. The House reports on
the legislative history of the fair use codification demonstrate that
Congress did not intend to “freeze” the doctrine of “fair use,” but
merely intended to promulgate a set of guidelines for the courts to
206
follow in their interpretations.
In its preamble, the Act gives several examples of uses that could
be considered “fair” by the courts, including “criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
207
scholarship, or research . . . .” The examples listed by Congress are
purposefully broad, and are by no means meant to be the outer limits
of what uses could be considered “fair.” The uses set forth by Congress in the preamble could all be considered “productive” or “transformative” uses, where the individual using the copyright is “adding
something” to the copyrighted work, as opposed to “reproductive”
uses, in spite of the fact that the public can benefit just as much from
208
“reproductive” uses as from “productive” uses.
1. The Purpose or Character of the Use
This first factor principally focuses on the distinction between
“commercial” and “non-commercial” uses and is designed to protect a
copyrighted work from commercial exploitation by a non-copyright
209
holder. Keeping with the Court’s interpretation in Folsom, however,

204
205

Id.
In its House Report on the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress notes that:

[a]lthough the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and
over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the
doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible,
and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts. On the other
hand, the courts have evolved a set of criteria which, though in no case definitive or
determinative, provide some gauge for balancing the equities.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
206 See id.
207 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
208 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
421 (1984), implicitly rejected an earlier holding by the Ninth Circuit based on a “productive
use” theory. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir.
1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
209 See Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 151-53 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that the defendant was unable to show an educational purpose for his fair use defense where
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a commercial purpose does not completely render it impossible for the
court to find a fair use defense, but “a court should not strain to apply
a fair use defense when it is being invoked by a profit-making defen210
dant . . . .” For this reason, non-profit educational uses will generally
create a presumption satisfying this factor, while uses that produce a
211
profit for the non-copyright holder generally will not.
The “purpose or character” factor also addresses “bad faith”
uses:
where a defendant has knowingly exploited a stolen manuscript or engaged in verbatim copying without any effort to
obtain permission from the copyright owner or cite the cop212
yright owner as the source of the material.
A finding of “bad faith,” like a finding of “commercial purpose,”
is not dispositive as to whether a use is ultimately fair. It merely
weighs for or against a defendant in conjunction with other factors
213
found to be important by the court. In addition, the “purpose or
character” factor addresses whether “comment and criticism” was a
214
primary motivation for a use. “However, an individual in rebutting a
copyrighted work containing derogatory information about himself
may copy such parts of the work as are necessary to permit unders215
tandable comment.”
2. The nature of the copyrighted work
When evaluating the nature of copyrighted works, courts are
more likely to allow fair uses of material that is informative in nature
than that which is expressive in nature, although, like any other factor,
he collected questions from medical course books for inclusion in a commercial preparatory
booklet); Twin Peaks Prod., Inc. v. Publ’ns, Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1370 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
the defendant liable, in spite of his argument for an “educational purpose” fair use, where he
copied plot details from plaintiff’s show for his book).
210 Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. at 153.
211 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1388-89 (6th Cir.
1996) (noting that even where a defendant’s customers would have a fair use defense showing a
nonprofit educational purpose, that defense will not be available to a defendant who takes “orders” to copy for commercial gain).
212 MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 477 (2005); see also Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (noting that “the propriety of
the defendant's conduct” is relevant to the first fair use factor).
213 NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 476-77 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the defendants, who copied the plaintiff’s copyrighted material in order to criticize their “cult,” were
engaged in a fair use, in spite of the fact that the defendants knew they were not authorized to
access the plaintiff’s work).
214 See Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting
that “Section 107 expressly permits fair use for the purposes of criticism and comment.”).
215 Id.
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a finding that a work is expressive will not completely eliminate a fair
216
use defense. This factor could be characterized as an embodiment of
the “public benefit” rationale, allowing wider uses for scientific, biographical or historical works than those which are purely expressive in
nature than for those which are purely expressive, such as rock con217
218
certs. This factor also addresses a work’s accessibility to the public.
Where works are more accessible to the public, the need for fair use
decreases, but where they are less accessible, the need for fair use is
219
likely to increase.
3. The amount or substantiality of the portion used
This factor, which is most often applied in relation to fair uses involving comment and criticism, asks whether the non-copyright holder
220
took more than the amount of a copyrighted work than he needed.
Where a non-copyright holding author has taken more of a copyrighted work than he needs for his critical points, he will abrogate a
221
defense under fair use.
Because it deals with “amount and substantiality,” this factor
forces courts to evaluate the quality as well as the quantity of the
222
work used by a non-copyright holder.
Where an author, even
through a small amount of copying, has essentially copied the essence
of a copyrighted work, this factor will not be satisfied, even if the
223
overall amount of the work copied is small in nature. The concern,
224
which relates closely to the fourth factor, is that if a non-copyright
holder engages in too much copying of a copyrighted work, the public’s need for the copy may wind up displacing the need for the origi216 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 496-97 (1984) (holding that time-shifting television programs was a fair use that relieved the petitioner of liability in
spite of the fact that “informational works . . . are less protected than creative works of entertainment[, and] Sony's own surveys indicate that entertainment shows account for more than
80% of the programs recorded by Betamax owners.”).
217 See LEAFFER, supra note 212, at 478.
218 See H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 71.
219 See id.
220 See Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that “the Supreme
Court . . . employed a qualitative rather than a numerical assessment” in assessing the amount
and substantiality argument); Sony, 464 U.S. at 496-97 (allowing a fair use defense in spite of the
fact that the “time-shifting” involved entire programs).
221 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 544 (1985) (holding
that where the amount of a work taken was qualitatively the “heart” of a copyrighted work, the
respondent failed under the “amount and substantiality” factor).
222 See id.
223 See id.
224 See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that factor three, “amount
and substantiality of the work used, and [factor four,] its effect upon the potential market for the
copyrighted material,” are factors which should be evaluated together).
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nal, undermining the “method” of achieving the public benefit purpose cited under the copyright clause.
4. Effect of the use on the potential market for, or value of, the
work
This factor examines whether a non-copyright holder’s use of a
copyrighted product will have a substantial effect on the market for
the original copyrighted work. The standard rationale for the fourth
factor relates closely to that for the third, “[i]f the market for the copyright owner’s work is harmed, the incentives for creativity that the
225
copyright monopoly is designed to encourage will not work.”
This factor focuses both on the actual market harm caused by a
defendant’s copying and on the potential harm a defendant’s copying
226
could have on the market for the author’s copyrighted work. Courts
consider not just the effect of an individual infringement on a given
market (which would normally be quite small, especially where the
use in question is a private use), but whether widespread conduct of
227
the kind would wind up affecting the market negatively. Because of
this “potential harm” rationale, courts are not obligated to consider
whether a work has been marketed by a defendant or not. The ambit
of “potential market harm” enables copyright holders to prevent defendants from claiming fair use by privately copying an author’s copy228
righted works. In order to defeat a defendant’s fair use claim under
this factor, a plaintiff only needs to demonstrate that there is a “mea229
ningful likelihood of future harm.” A plaintiff does not need to
show that he was actually harmed or would be harmed by a use in
order to prevail against a defendant’s fair use claim. In answering
225 LEAFFER, supra note 212, at 478. Notice that the rationale is stated in terms of copyright holders, not authors. What if this rationale was not true? Authors seemed perfectly willing
to create works before copyright and they seem to be willing, even today, to create works in spite
of the fact that financial rewards are extremely unlikely. Certainly copyright holders would be
harmed by these uses, but the constitutional question is (or should be) whether, in the end, the
public would have access to less works.
226 The Copyright Act creates a ‘wide berth” for the “market harm” factor by expressly
stating market harm in terms of potentiality. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). Obviously, a showing
of actual harm would, in itself, be conclusive as to whether there was potential harm, so it is safe
to assume that actual harm would fall into the ambit of § 107(4). Id.
227 Courts should “consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular
actions of the alleged infringer, but also ‘whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the
sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ for the original.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
228 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2782 (2005)
(finding “evidence of infringement on a gigantic scale” in spite of the fact that the evidence
consisted of noncommercial copying by the service’s users); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming similar finding under a clear error standard).
229 LEAFFER, supra note 212, at 472.

2007]

“Leave Them Kids Alone”

277

whether there is a “meaningful likelihood of future harm,” courts
generally address whether the market for the copy will significantly
230
displace the market for the original.
Appling the “purpose/method” rationale to this factor, it appears
that the argument looks like this: Authors are encouraged to create
and seek to publish new expressive works by the guarantee of a statutory monopoly under the Copyright Clause. The reason this monopoly
is guaranteed is because the public derives a benefit from these new
works. Therefore, any works that infringe on the monopoly necessarily infringe on the artist’s incentive to create. This argument rests on
two critical assumptions: (1) that authors create works principally for
profit and (2) that the public benefit accrued by the wide use of existing works is somehow smaller than the public benefit accrued by the
restriction of copying works. The problem is that the industry itself
has proven the first assumption wrong; artists routinely create property that record companies are able to use to turn a substantial profit,
231
but that profit does not find its way back to the artist. Somehow, this
does not seem to disincentivize creation. The second assumption can
be attacked on two points: (a) imposing a limitation on P2P distribution not only imposes a limitation on copyright, but on technology as
well, and (b) the axis of the balance, if one considers that the Copyright Clause is essentially a grant of monopoly endorsed by the government, should be, at default, in favor of the public interest in dissemination.
C. Technology and Fair Use, the Push-Pull Relationship
Courts have not adopted Congress’s rationale of “productive
use” altogether in their interpretations of what does and does not constitute a Fair use. Often, the most divergent interpretations of fair
uses come on the heels of new technologies, such as copying machines,
videocassette recorders, or Internet file-sharing networks. This section
looks at each of those technologies in turn and examines how the
court applied nontraditional methodologies to these uses in order to

230

In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 948 (9th Cir. 2002), the court notes that:

Kelly's markets for his images include using them to attract advertisers and buyers to
his web site, and selling or licensing the images to other web sites or stock photo databases. By giving users access to Kelly's full-sized images on its own web site, Arriba
harms all of Kelly's markets. Users will no longer have to go to Kelly's web site to
see the full-sized images, thereby deterring people from visiting his web site.
Id.
231

See Albini, supra note 188.
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balance the “purpose” and “method” proscribed under the Copyright
Clause.
1. The photocopier
The first case in which the Supreme Court dealt with a fair use
involving photocopying equipment was Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
232
United States. In that case, the U.S. Government, through its National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) and its National Library of Medicine,
photocopied and distributed articles from medical journals to anyone
233
who made a request for them. In a number of cases, the circulation
of the medical journals was low, meaning that those seeking the articles did not have many practical alternative means of acquiring
234
them. In spite of the fact that millions of pages had been photocopied and it was probable that the photocopies of the articles had inevitably found their way into a number of commercial uses, the Supreme Court did not disturb a lower court holding that the government’s use of these medical journals was fair because the plaintiff had
235
failed to prove its future harm adequately. The court also noted that
the dictionary definition of “copy” was inadequate to address the
meaning of the word “copy” put forth under the Copyright Act of
236
1909. The court also noted that since the invention of the photocopier, a culture had developed among libraries where photocopying
articles had become accepted, and this culture, to the extent that it
237
advanced knowledge, was beneficial to the public.
The courts seemed to scale back this rationale in American Geo238
physical Union v. Texaco (“Texaco”). The defendant in that case had
a corporate policy of photocopying relevant journal articles from periodicals it purchased and storing them in a library for future use by its
239
employees. Although there was no direct commercial advantage in
232 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States 487 F.2d 1345 (1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
One interesting aspect of this case is that the relevant statute was the Copyright Act of 1909, not
1976. Williams & Wilkins and its progeny seem to have wrought significant changes in the Copyright Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000). Perhaps P2P file sharing will have the same effect
on a future copyright act. If so, decisions involving P2P file sharing are likely to have an impact
on the act’s language.
233 Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1348. The NIH did have a policy not to copy and distribute journals that were part of its widely available list and not to honor excessive requests from
any single institution, but these policies had exceptions. Id. at 1349.
234 See id. at 1356.
235 Id. at 1358.
236 Id. at 1351.
237 See id. at 1355-56.
238 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); aff’d, 37 F.3d 881
(2d Cir. 1994).
239 Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 4-5.
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the articles, the Second Circuit held that the defendant was not engaging in fair use because it could easily have purchased additional journal subscriptions instead of photocopying the journals and storing
240
them away. Even though the defendant argued that its use was for
research and that the burden of the extra transaction costs imposed
upon the defendant by having to purchase additional journals would
outweigh the benefit of its research, the fact that the research conducted by the defendant ultimately led to a commercial purpose was
241
enough to hold it liable for infringement.
242
In Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services,
the court held that a defendant could not take excerpts from copyrighted books in order to profit, even when the purpose ultimately
243
served was educational in nature. The facts in that case showed that
the defendant, the owner of a small copy shop, was engaged in the
business of creating “coursepacks” for professors at the University of
244
Michigan. The defendant did not seek permission from the copy245
right owners to create these coursepacks. The court held that this
copying was not a fair use because by copying those works for profit,
the defendant was clearly competing in a market for the copyrighted
246
works. This finding was made in spite of the fact that under the
preamble language of the fair use doctrine as codified in section 108,
the professors requesting these coursepacks could have gathered and
247
copied the material on their own.
The photocopier cases are interesting because they present a
clear “case study” of how the fair use doctrine can be used to protect
certain uses of new technologies. Photocopying law seems to have
developed a “pattern” that courts should adopt for future technological advances like P2P: a new technology was created; in a legal vacuum, a “culture” formed around the use of the technology; under the
“fair use” doctrine, a jurisprudence was allowed to develop around the
culture; the market adjusted. This is a good way to create new doctrine without being overly restrictive or overly permissive. A second
example exists with videocassette recorders.

240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247

Id. at 19.
Id. at 29.
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1389.
Id. at 1384.
Id.
Id. at 1387.
Id. at 1389.
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2. The videocassette recorder
248

In Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. the Supreme
Court dealt principally with the issue of whether Sony, by creating and
marketing a machine that was capable of copying television broad249
casts, was liable as a contributory infringer. Because the Supreme
Court held that the manufacturer of a product that was being used to
infringe could not be liable so long as its product was capable of “substantial noninfringing uses,” liability for contributory infringement
rests implicitly on a finding of direct infringement by those using a
product. Therefore, the Court was forced to deal with the sub-issue of
250
whether a product’s use constituted direct infringement. Writing for
the majority, Justice Stevens held that the habit of “time shifting,” that
is, of users recording programs to watch later on at their leisure, was
indeed a fair use because non-commercial uses placed the burden on
the plaintiff to demonstrate that they could suffer potential harm, and
the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that they suffered this
251
harm. The defendant also proffered “library building” as a potential
fair use, but the Supreme Court did not reach that question since it
concluded (a) that the defendant’s product need only be capable of a
single fair use for Sony to avoid liability, and (b) that “time shifting”
252
was just such a fair use.
Sony is significant for a number of reasons. First, it represents an
abrogation by the Supreme Court of the Congressional doctrine of
253
“productive use” as a basis for fair use. The use by the directlyinfringing parties in Sony is purely reproductive in nature, lends a
great deal of support to the holding in Williams & Wilkins that not all
254
reproductive uses will necessarily be unfair. Second, Sony seems to

248

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Id. at 420.
250 Id. at 442.
251 See id. at 450-51 (noting that “a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential
market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the
author's incentive to create. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit
access to ideas without any countervailing benefit.”).
252 Id. at 442.
253 Id. at 455 n.40 (noting that “[t]he distinction between "productive" and "unproductive"
uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance[in a determination of whether a given use is fair],
but it cannot be wholly determinative. Although copying to promote a scholarly endeavor certainly has a stronger claim to fair use than copying to avoid interrupting a poker game, the question is not simply two-dimensional.”); see also id. at 478 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority’s rejection of the productive use standard).
254 Compare id. at 455 n.40, with Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States 487 F.2d 1345, 1353
(1973) (noting that “[i]t has sometimes been suggested that the copying of an entire copyrighted
work . . . cannot ever be “fair use,” but this is an overbroad generalization, unsupported by the
decisions and rejected by years of accepted practice.”).
249
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imply a stronger presumption to private noncommercial uses, at least
where the initial product is free. No one argued in Sony that the en255
tire audience was engaged in an educational purpose. Indeed, the
nature of the works in the majority of cases were clearly expressive,
256
and not informational. In spite of that, the Court in the Sony ruled
257
that there was no direct infringement done by time-shifting.
So where does this leave fair use? It seems that the doctrine is
suffering from divergent trends. Sony and Williams & Wilkins seem to
258
suggest that private noncommercial uses can be okay. Sony, in fact,
seems to reach even farther because the vast majority of television
259
programs are “expressive,” rather than “informative” works. Texaco
and Princeton both seem to come down fairly hard on commercial
uses, but it is important to remember that they do not really reach the
question of whether those same uses would be okay in a noncommer260
cial sense.
In the file-sharing context, the difference seems to be one of
scale. The Ninth Circuit rejected the fair use arguments made by the
defendants in Napster, but the deciding factor seemed to be the potential availability of the copyrighted material was something which rendered the end-users’ approach unfair, especially in the context of Rio’s
seeming ratification of the same “space shifting” argument made by
261
the defendants in Napster. Grokster, however, could be seen as
something more akin to direct commercial infringement. The respondent in that case clearly made a profitable use of others copyrighted
material in spite of the fact that it never uploaded the material onto its

255

See generally Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
Id.
257 Id. at 442.
258 See id (allowing noncommercial time shifting); Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1353
(allowing noncommercial photocopying).
259 See Litman, supra note 15, at 24-25 (discussing the elusiveness of the distinction between
information and expression and suggesting that the underlying arguments for distinguishing
these two ultimately fail).
260 See Texaco, 802 F. Supp. 1 (holding that copying journal articles was not a fair use because Texaco was ultimately using their contents for a commercial purpose); Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a business that
produced “coursepacks” which included copyrighted material was unfairly profiting from other
artists’ copyrights and thus was not engaged in a “fair use”).
261 Compare A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding no merit in Napster’s “space shifting” argument), with Recording Industry Ass’n of America,
Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that “[t]he
Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or "space-shift," those files that already
reside on a user's hard drive[]” and that “[s]uch copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act”).
256
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website; the task of engaging in actual infringement was left to the
262
users who inhabited the network.
There is another interesting aspect to consider when looking at
the line of P2P cases in comparison to photocopying and videocassette
recorder cases. P2P cases seem, by necessity, to involve a morass of
infringement standards for contributory, vicarious, direct, and recently
263
“inducement” liability. This extensive importation and use of standards that are not expressly mentioned in the Copyright Act strongly
264
suggests that P2P technology has outstripped the statutory language.
Ordinarily, courts treading on what is clearly new ground would show
great deference to Congress and the public’s interest in leaving new
technologies unfettered, but unlike the courts in the photocopier and
videocassette recorder cases, courts judging liability in P2P seem to
have lost sight of the “public purpose” rationale and the idea that
Congress should be the entity deciding how to deal with P2P. Courts
in P2P cases seem principally concerned with protecting of an imagined property right over the reproduction of published music. Such
265
an interpretation is not supported by history. Instead courts should
police these new technologies carefully, with an eye towards maintaining maximum dissemination and technological development while
ensuring that enough is left to incentivize creation.
D. Reinstating the Public Benefit Rationale via The Fair Use Doctrine
Modern interpretations of the Copyright Clause, in both a legislative and judicial sense, seem to suffer from two principal evils, confusion and amnesia. The first evil is confusion between the “purpose,”
achieving a public benefit, and the “method,” the granting of statutory
266
monopolies. The second evil is amnesia regarding the underlying
267
history of the copyright clause. Congress’s interpretation of copy268
rights, with the CTEA, and the courts’ interpretations of copyrights,

262 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005)
(noting that the respondent marketed a product with the intent to profit from the infringement
of others and encouraged such infringement).
263 See, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013, 1019, 1022 (addressing arguments for direct, contributory and vicarious liability); Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776 (2005) (addressing arguments for contributory and vicarious liability but ultimately holding respondent liable under a theory of inducement liability).
264 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000).
265 See discussion infra Part III(a).
266 See Dallon, supra note 2, at 367-68.
267 The “public benefit” rationale and its history in copyright is discussed in detail in Part
III(a) of this comment.
268 See S. Rep. No. 104-315 at 3 (listing “fairness to the artist” as a factor in passing the
CTEA).
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in Eldred, Napster and Aimster, suggest that the courts, while they
do mention the public benefit rationale, have acted mainly to protect
the rights of the copyright holders, often at the expense of the public
and without proof that the protection incentivizes creation. Courts
have tried to strike a balance between copyright holders’ benefits, the
artists’ incentives and the public domain, but the axis of this balance is
in the wrong place.
1. Balancing artist’s incentive with the public benefit
A discussion of a proper balance between artists’ rights and the
public benefit should start by recognizing two extremes. The public
would achieve the maximum benefit from an artists’ work if it had
completely unhindered “productive” and “reproductive” use of it. Of
course, the copyright clause, the Statute of Anne, and the printers licenses before it have underscored the point that the “maximum public
benefit” is not achievable because artists would have no “incentive” to
272
create new works. On the other side of the pendulum, the “maximum artists’ benefit” would be achieved through perpetual copyright.
History, however, explicitly rejects this conclusion in favor of the pub273
lic benefit rationale. It is clear that a balance is necessary, but that
balance should be focused from a de minimis perspective in terms of
copyright, and should take into account a number of factors, including
the realities of how the “method” of monetary incentives relates to
artists’ decisions to create works in a given industry.
The doctrine of “fair use” has historically been the judiciary’s method of guarding against the harshness of copyright statutes, but this
doctrine should be broadened to ensure that the Copyright Act meets
the underlying “purpose” of the Copyright Clause. In other words, the
judiciary, in an effort to ensure that Congress has not overstepped the
limitations provided under the Copyright Clause, should engage in a
“public benefit” assessment of Congressional legislation and determine the minimum amount of copy protection necessary in order to
maintain an incentive for artists to create new works. This judicial
269 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199, 204 (2003) (accepting, under rational review,
Congress’ extension of the protection provided by the Copyright Act by 20 years).
270 See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (ignoring
the premise that the public benefits merely from having access to music online).
271 See generally In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (ignoring the
premise that the public benefits merely from having access to all of this music online).
272 There is, of course, the Jewish law-based argument that attribution and accurate copying
are protection enough because writers and artists have reasons besides monetary incentive to
create expressive works. This argument has also been addressed in an Internet context. See
generally Litman, supra note 16, at 24-25.
273 This concept is addressed in detail in Part III(a) of this comment.
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balancing would necessitate an “in-between” standard for noncommercial use, where there is no commercial piracy and the “potential
market effect” is only judged by the aggregate effects of copying copyrighted material.
This is not to say that artists should receive only a minimum of
protection. From an “artists’ benefit” perspective, the core of copyright law should be focused on the prevention of profitable uses.
Copyright owners should definitely be allowed to prevent others from
making a profit off of their work, but where the question of profit is in
the aggregate only, the court should consider additional factors in its
fair use analysis beyond the traditional four factors mandated by the
274
1976 act. Courts (and legislatures) should examine (1) the incentive
provided to the author by his industry and whether the author’s pri275
mary incentive in the creation of the works in question is monetary,
276
(2) how long, on average, that monetary incentive lasts, (3) whether a
given restriction on copyrighted material displaces other uses of a
technology that may ultimately be “fair,” and (4) whether the benefit
provided to the public by the availability and enjoyment of expressive
works displaces potential loss in artists’ incentives. If “public benefit”
is the central concern, what is the point of limiting access to an artists’
work when the artist is not making money from it and the limitation
imposes restrictions that infringe on legitimate uses?
2. Balancing P2P file sharing
Applying this rationale in a P2P context demonstrates two things:
first, there are already a number of “fair” or “arguably fair” uses for
P2P technology. These programs can be used to download public domain material as easily as they can be used to download copyrighted

274

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
If it can be shown that, on average, artists receive no money (or very little) from the
publication of their works, where does this leave the rationale of the artists’ incentive? If artists
are creating works for free, and the public would be most benefited by access to those works,
why impose restrictions on them at all? Placing these limitations on use makes sense when it is
necessary to protect copyright holders who are engaging in dissemination, but if technology
serves the dissemination function, we should be willing to reevaluate copyright incentives that
have been based on the necessity of remunerating publishers.
276 This would essentially be a reason for a reduction of the terms of copyright protection
rather than an extension of fair use, although one could argue that the fact that a work is past its
moneymaking prime could enhance an argument for noncommercial fair use. Furthermore,
record companies routinely stop printing albums after sales drop below a given level, which is
usually after a few years. Singer-songwriter Janis Ian states flatly that she is “annoyed that so
many records I once owned are out of print, and the only place I could find them was Napster.”
Ian Article, supra note 95.
275
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material. The Supreme Court has ratified “time shifting” as a fair
use, arguably, those listening to songs they already heard on the radio
are merely “time-shifting” those materials on their own. The argument that the listeners are getting commercial-free, deejay-free versions of those recordings is irrelevant, since the same could be accomplished by the studious use of a cassette player or CD-recorder.
There are other “arguably fair” uses of P2P networks which include “space-shifting,” “sampling,” and “library-building” that could
be considered fair, but this is not really the point, because it confers no
direct financial benefit to its users, noncommercial trading should fall
into that “in between” category where it is necessary for the court to
look at how private file sharing is affecting the author’s incentive to
create and the invention and use of new technologies.
This balance first necessitates a examination of the music industry as a whole in order to answer the first two “factors”: (1) the incentive provided to the author by his industry and whether the author’s
primary incentive in the creation of the works in question is monetary
and (2) how long, on average, that monetary incentive lasts.
If artists made CDs in order to make money in the music industry, they would be very poor. The average professional artist—after
production, distribution, and promotion costs—actually loses money
278
on his CDs. Most artists make most of their money from playing in
live shows and, in some cases, merchandising, but only artists at the
very top of the industry ever see any money from the sale of their
CDs. Therefore, it would be fair to say that even if artists got into the
“music business” to make money, the primary benefactor of CD profits is the middleman, the record label. This is similar to the “printer’s
licenses” in medieval Europe, which were set in place specifically to
ensure that publishers would recoup their costs for production and
distribution without fear that their market would be diluted by for277 By themselves, P2P programs are simply file searching and transferring mechanisms that
do not discriminate between file types. See discussion infra Part II(a).
278 See Albini, supra note 188. Steve Albini, a record industry insider, breaks down the cash
amounts involved in an average recording contract and how those amounts are generally stacked
against artists. Albini notes that after making the first album in a four album contract and accounting for all of the industry-standard deductions, his hypothetical major label band:

is now 1/4 of the way through its contract, has made the music industry more than 3
million dollars richer, but is in the hole $14,000 on royalties. The band members have
each earned about 1/3 as much as they would working at a 7-11, but they got to ride
in a tour bus for a month. The next album will be about the same, except that the
record company will insist they spend more time and money on it. Since the previous one never "recouped," the band will have no leverage, and will oblige.
Id.
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profit pirates. The costs incurred in the production of music, however,
279
have decreased dramatically with the advent of digital technology. It
simply does not cost as much today to make a song or a record as it
did 10 years ago, and to the extent that record companies say it costs
the same or more, they are simply being wasteful. Furthermore, the
costs that are incurred in distributing music are precisely the same
costs that are (or should be) significantly reduced by the Internet. It is
simply no longer necessary to press hundreds of thousands of CDs
and ship them across the United States because posting them on a
single website with enough bandwidth accomplishes precisely the
same end. Record companies should not ask, via copyright infringement suits in the courts, for the public to subsidize an outmoded method of production and distribution.
The average life of a song, in terms of being a viable candidate for
printing and distribution, is much shorter than its viability for taking
up not-very-much space on several thousand hard drives in a P2P
280
network. Certainly, there are songs that have a long “shelf-life” and
are worth printing and shipping again and again, but these are the exception, not the rule. Examining copyright from a public benefit perspective should give us pause in saying that the rule should be written
from the perspective of the exception. If we acknowledge that a large
number of the songs available on P2P networks have outlived their
“profitable lives,” and we acknowledge that the public would benefit
from access to those songs, and we assume that those songs are not
being used to make a profit for someone other than the author, there
is no incentive to curtail their private use and enjoyment by members
of the public.
The third aspect of the “in-between” balancing test asks us to examine the nature of P2P file-sharing services themselves and ask
whether a restriction on the use of that software would undermine the
public benefit of the copyright clause by placing restrictions on the
“fair use” of other works already in the public domain. The balance of
this factor clearly lies in favor of the P2P networks, since, in addition
to the other arguments posed above, curtailing infringing activity on
279 The wide availability and high quality of digital recording equipment has significantly
decreased the fixed costs of producing music. Expensive reel-to-reel machines that were ubiquitous 30 years ago are now only in vogue for artists seeking a “vintage” sound.
280 For a very interesting viewpoint on consumer behavior with the Internet as a vehicle for
finding and disseminating works, see Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, WIRED MAG. (October
2004), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/tail.html. Anderson posits that the
future lies in Internet technology’s ability to address cultural niches, because the Internet, with
its ability to store information cheaply and indefinitely and its ability to reach out to consumers
all over the world, can make potentially valuable markets by aggregating a world full of users
with common interests. See id.
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these networks would necessarily curtail the public benefit provided
by the availability of these file-sharing programs in the first place. The
public’s access to works in the public domain should be the chief consideration, and since P2P file sharing improves access to these works,
it should not be curtailed. This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
“fair use” rationale in Williams & Wilkins and in Sony.
The fourth aspect of the “in-between” balancing test is simple
balance, does the benefit provided to the public by the availability and
enjoyment of these works displace the artists’ incentives to create new
works? Since artists receive very little money for the writing and production of their CDs, it is hard to argue that allowing P2P file sharing
will impact the amount an artist can make on a CD, and therefore impact their financial incentive to create new works. It will impact the
middlemen, the record labels, who are making the lion’s share of the
profit from CD sales. Under the old copyright regime of the 1976 act,
this would have been disastrous because an artist’s only route to the
public was via a well-financed music publishing and distributing entity,
but this is simply no longer true. It is important to keep in mind, however, that this new standard does not affect an artists’ right to make all
profit from the sale of his material, it merely suggests that where the
material is being consumed and shared in a noncommercial sense, not
sold, the standards should be different.
V. CONCLUSION
File sharing, whether we like it or not, is here to stay. Regardless
of whether any of the arguments above are compelling, this technology is a reality that we are going to have to start dealing with sooner or
later. Record companies may not be able to “compete with free,” and
in spite of the Supreme Court’s ruling holding Grokster liable, file
sharing probably cannot be stopped because the program architecture
281
is entirely decentralized.
But where does the law sit? Recognizing that file sharing is here
to stay and saying it is legal are two different things. History, however,
supports a vision of copyright law that is grounded in prohibiting
commercial infringement, and seems to have been designed for a
physical distribution system that is currently an outmoded means of
production. Furthermore, copyright is a statutory monopoly, and like
other monopolies, we should approach copyright from a perspective
that applies the minimum amount of protection necessary to accomplish its purpose, incentivizing the creation of expressive content. If
281 At the time this conclusion was written, on Saturday, February 4th, 2006, there were
2,611,175 users on the now-illegal FastTrack network sharing 273,066,117 files with one another.

288

FIU Law Review

[3:235

the current state of the recording industry makes it clear that artists
create not with the hope of financial remuneration but with the hope
of increasing their exposure to audiences worldwide, then our understanding of copyright as a potentially repressive monopoly would require us to restrict the protection. In other words, if artists will create
music recordings for free, then we should not impose a monopoly that
makes the public pay for musc.
With that premise in mind, we then need to consider whether the
law affords our legal system a vehicle for this emerging jurisprudence.
The fair use doctrine would be an excellent way for courts to reinstate
an understanding of copyright law based on the concerns described
above. Under section 107 of the Copyright Act, courts are allowed to
take other factors into consideration besides the four factors listed in
282
the act itself. A public interest based version of copyright jurisprudence should prompt courts to examine (1) the incentive provided to
the author by his industry and whether the author’s primary incentive
in the creation of the works in question is monetary, (2) how long, on
average, that monetary incentive lasts, (3) whether a given restriction
on copyrighted material displaces other uses of a technology that may
ultimately be “fair,” and (4) whether the benefit provided to the public by the availability and enjoyment of expressive works displaces
potential loss in artists’ incentives. Applying this rationale to P2P file
sharing makes it clear that this use could easily be considered fair, at
least under circumstances where the end-user is not making a profit
from an artist’s copyrighted work.
This article is simply attempt to match the law to what appears to
be an emerging economic reality. The public is unlikely to support a
law that holds a large number of Americans liable to major record
conglomerates because they downloaded the new Beastie Boys song
they just heard on the radio. In fact, history lends support an alternate
understanding of what copyright is designed to do, and, as with the
photocopier and the VCR, we should endorse a vision of copyright
that balances the public’s expectations with the incentives of artists.
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See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).

